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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
In almost all countries worldwide the telecommunication sector was characterized by 
state owned monopolies, and supplying telecommunication services was understood 
as a public duty. In the eighties of the last century, most countries began to liberalize 
their telecommunication market and try to open it up for competition. The 
establishment of competition in a former monopolized sector can be only successful 
by taking specific network related features into account. This thesis deals with the 
establishment of competition in the telecommunication market taking into account the 
so-called “essential facilities doctrine”. This doctrine was developed from the U.S. 
American anti-trust law and is a helpful instrument to ensure access, under specific 
circumstances, by new competitors to facilities which are controlled by a market-
dominating operator. 
Chapter 2 will give an overview of the telecommunication network economics that 
need to be taken into account when establishing competition in this field. The third 
chapter of this thesis deals with the advantages and disadvantages of sector specific 
regulation, as an instrument for competition establishment, in comparison with the 
existing competition rules. The next chapter will give an overview of the European 
approach to open up the telecommunication sector for competition and the 
subsequent chapter will show how the “essential facilities doctrine” is implemented in 
this connection in the European law and as an example in the German law as a 
member state of the European Union. An overview of the South African approach in 
the establishment of competition taking into account the “essential facilities doctrine” 
will be found in chapter 6, and in the final chapter both approaches will be compared 
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CHAPTER 2 BASICS OF TELECOMMUNICATION 
NETWORK ECONOMICS - WHAT NEEDS TO 
BE OBSERVED TO ESTABLISH 
COMPETITION IN THIS FIELD? 
This chapter will give an overview of the basics of network economics and answer 
the question under which specific circumstances it might be possible to open up the 
telecommunication network for competition. This question was fundamentally 
discussed during recent years based on the historical development of the worldwide 
telecommunication market. Generally, until the beginning of the eighties of the last 
century, the telecommunication market and, in conjunction with it the 
telecommunication network, was characterized worldwide by state-owned 
telecommunication companies as national monopolies which often ran in conjunction 
with postal services. Furthermore, most countries understood the provision of 
telecommunication services as an exclusive national responsibility. This attitude was 
underlined by some countries, like Germany, by embedding this exclusive national 
duty in their constitution.1 Because of the worldwide understanding of the 
telecommunication market and the supply of telecommunication services as a 
“natural monopoly” which could only be regulated as a national responsibility, 
competition in this field was neither possible nor allowed because of the available 
network, the technical infrastructure and the fact of state controlled regulation. 
Furthermore, the countries were convinced that only state-owned telecommunication 
companies, which were structured as monopolies, were able to ensure the access for 
the whole population of a country to the telecommunication services under the same 
conditions. During the eighties, most countries worldwide began to liberalise their 
telecommunication markets. One reason for this liberalisation process was the 
realisation by governments worldwide that this would become important for the 
economic growth of each particular country in the future and that telecommunication 
itself would set the tone for future business growth. The liberalisation process in the 
                                            
1In the German constitution “Grundgesetz” (GG) is this exclusive national duty embedding in Art. 73 Nr. 2 GG; Art. 80 section 2 
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telecommunication sector has not yet been concluded, and it has to be emphasized 
that it is highly influenced by network specific economic characteristics about which 
the following will give an overview. The chapter will close with an answer to the 
question whether it might be possible to open up the telecommunication network for 
competition and under which conditions.  
To understand the network specific economic conditions it is necessary to 
understand how a “telecommunication network” has to be defined.  An easy and 
popular way to find a definition of this term is to use an internet search engine. By 
doing this, Wikipedia came up with the result that a “network” has to be generally 
defined as a method of sharing information between two systems.2 To complete this 
definition in connection with the telecommunication sector it is furthermore necessary 
to define the term “telecommunication” which can be generally described as the 
transmission of signals over a distance for the purpose of communication.3 Hence, it 
is possible to define the telecommunication network in general as a “method for 
transmitting signals over a (long) distance for the purpose of communication”. This 
general definition is not able to identify the network specific economic characteristics 
of the telecommunication network and therefore the subject is worthy of academic 
research. For that reason the term “network” needs to be considered from an 
economic point of view.  
2.1 Network concept influenced by economic aspects (basic 
overview) 
There is also no consistent description of the term “network” from an economic point 
of view. For the purpose of this discussion, it seems to be useful to define this 
concept as a wide and complex transport and logistic system for goods, persons and 
information.4 Furthermore, this description is so flexible that it captures the physical 
networks like road system or networks in the water, gas, electricity and 
                                            
2 http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/network  [Accessed 31 October 2008]. 
3 http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/telecommunication  [Accessed 31 October 2008]. 
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telecommunication sector and also more abstract network structures like in the post 
or computer network sector.5 
Specifically in the telecommunication sector the concept of a network comprises of 
two different components: A network component and a service component. 
Furthermore, these components can be split into two different markets: The access to 
the telecommunication network as a basis to render telecommunication service and 
the consumer service market.6 
The network component in the telecommunication sector falls undoubtedly into the 
area of infrastructure. Competition in the infrastructure sector is described as 
“network competition” which also influences the telecommunication market for the 
consumer service.7 Apart from the fact that network structures are characterized 
differently, there is an essential common factor in specific sectors from an economic 
point of view: the provision and maintenance of network connections cause costs and 
benefits. The special characteristics of network structures of the side of cost and 
benefits define the term “network” and may also be responsible for market failure, 
depending on the circumstances connected.8 They will be described briefly hereafter. 
Subsequently, and in connection with the basics of the network economics, the 
meaning of competition in the form of network competition will be described. 
2.2 Economic particular characteristics of network structures 
The following description of economic particular characteristics can be used for any 
kind of a network and is not restricted to the telecommunication network. 
Furthermore, it will be just an overview without information in too much detail. 
Generally, network structures are characterized by a combination of economies of 
scale and irreversible costs, which can arise from unbreakable natural monopolies.9 
Network operators supply different products by using the network infrastructure. From 
an economic point of view one must distinguish between different kinds of economies 
                                            
5 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 5. 
6 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 5. 
7 Wolfgang Burr Netzwettbewerb in der Telekommunikation (1995) .6. 
8 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 5. 
9 Thomas Kiessling Optimale Marktstrukturierung in der Telekommunikation: Lehren aus den USA und anderen Ländern für die  
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of scale10 for these operators: Firstly, with an analysis of the different products is it 
possible to investigate the cost structure of each product supplied in their production. 
In this connection, a cost advantage may arise for the suppliers within a bigger 
output, which reduces the average production cost with an increase of the 
production. This economic average is known as product specific economies of scale. 
As a consequence it may happen that in a network with sufficient capacity the costs 
of transport increase under-proportionally in comparison with the transported quantity 
of products. Due to the fact that the definition given above from the theory of 
“economies of scale” is not in a position to cover network operators which supply 
different products by using the network infrastructure and that these theory by itself is 
too simple to describe the conditions of a “naturally modern monopoly”, the theory of 
“economies of scope” was also developed.11 
The theory of “economies of scope” purports that the production of different products 
in conjunction with each other is more cost effective than their separate production. 
Those “economies of scales” can be found in any network structures like the road 
system, telecommunication network or the wastewater system. In addition to the 
“economies of scale”, there are also cost advantages for the widely interlinked 
networks in the matter of transportation of huge amounts of products or services over 
a (long) distance:12 
 
• These cost advantages arise out of the so called “two-third rule”13 which states  
that the volume of a service, which is determined by the capacity, increases 
faster than the cost by supplying more service.   
• They can also arise from the interlinking of cables from networks, which 
bundle the transport capacities to so-called network hierarchies. This method 
ensures a better use of the capacity.14 
                                            
10  Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 6. 
11  Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 6. 
12  Christian von Weizsäcker ´Wettbewerb in Netzen´ (1997)  WuW ,  572 at 573. 
13  Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 7. 
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• Finally, regarding the fluctuations of demand, which requires availability of 
reserve capacity in the network, economies of scope may arise from 
“commingling effect”.  Due to the “commingling effect” the necessary network 
capacity per participant decreased with an increase of the numbers of 
participants. This means that a bigger network needs less reserve capacity as 
a smaller network.15 
 
All these bundling advantages, which arise from a network, can be summarised as 
“distance cost decrease”, which means that the transport cost per kilometre over a 
longer distance will be decrease sharply.16 
Furthermore, another general characteristic of network economics is that an 
advantage of productivity may arise due to interconnection of networks.17  
All these economic characteristics described above are the cause of subadditivity of 
the cost function in a network, which is a necessary and adequate condition for the 
justification of a natural modern monopoly.18 It means, in particular, that the 
aggregate demand of a specific product (economies of scale) or of several products 
(economies of scope) can be offered by an exclusive (monopolistic) supplier cost-
effectively and macro-economically with less use of resources than by multiple 
competing businesses.19 This situation describes a form of market failure in which 
competition is only possible based on increased costs and the waste of resources, 
and it is the (monopolistic) supplier, who is able to produce in the most cost-effective 
way, who will ultimately be able to survive.20 Due to this there was in the past an 
academical justificatio  for the restriction in competition and regulations in natural 
modern monopolies, which were classified as an area of exception where competition 
is not possible and desirable, and the telecommunication sector was regarded as 
such a an area of exception over a long time.21 Furthermore, the findings from the 
theory of the natural modern monopoly were also used to legitimise the 
establishment of public, and mostly state owned, service monopolies in the network-
                                            
15  Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 7. 
16  Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 7. 
17  Christian von Weizsäcker ´Wettbewerb in Netzen´ (1997)  WuW ,  572 at 573. 
18  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subadditivity#Economics [Accessed 31 October 2008] 
19  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subadditivity#Economics [Accessed 31 October 2008] 
 
20  Rupert Windisch Privatisierung natürlicher Monopole im Bereich von Bahn, Post und Telekommunikation (1987) 56. 
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structured sectors. Also economic characteristics from the consumer point of view 
were used to legitimise the fact, that network structured sectors were not opened up 
for competition. In this connection, natural modern monopolies were characterised as 
follows: A consumer will get an advantage of using the network services when more, 
connected consumers are interested in the same service, e.g. a nationwide service 
can be used or a minimum of consumers necessary for the establishment of a 
functional network and network standards to make the service cost-effective.22 
All economic characteristics described above result in the criteria of indivisibility of a 
network. This means for the market structure that in a network structured market, 
depending from the subadditivity of the cost function, the numbers of network 
suppliers will be restricted by a narrow oligopoly or, in an extreme situation, there will 
be only one supplier – a natural modern monopolist.23 
2.3 The theory of the contestable markets 
A natural modern monopoly itself cannot be used as a competition theory for the 
market failure of interlinked markets or to legitimise the regulation of market power 
because the subadditivity of the cost function alone is not able to implement a market 
power of the network suppliers. In terms of the theory of the contestable markets is it 
possible to establish a competition in a natural modern monopoly.24 Due to this 
theory, the criteria of the “sunk cost” became more accepted.25 The criterion of the 
“sunk costs “means that the condition for a potential competitor disciplining a 
monopolist is the access to the network and the absence of irreversible costs. 
Accordingly, a market is contestable and there will be the possibility of an efficiency 
gain through competition if there is an unhindered access to the network and the 
market exit is free of charge.26 To reach this goal the following conditions have to be 
fulfilled: 
 
                                            
22 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 8. 
23 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 9. 
24 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 10. 
25 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 10. 
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• For an unhindered access to the network there needs to be a guarantee that a 
multitude of potential competitors will have unlimited access to the same, cost-
effective technology without loss of time.27 
• The bottom line for the question whether a market is contestable or not is the 
criterion of the “hit and run entry”.28 The criterion of the “hit and run entry” is 
characterized by irreversible investment. An investment to a network is 
irreversible, if the investment is sufficient to get access to the market, but in 
the event of an exit, the investment cannot be used for another market. These 
investment costs are so-called “sunk costs”.29 In the telecommunication sector 
in particular, high investment costs for the construction of a nationwide cable 
network were necessary because in the past every telecommunication service, 
e.g. voice service or faxes, needed its own cable network. Furthermore, the 
dismantling of one of such cable networks and their re-installation in another 
area would be costly. However, today a wide spectrum of services can be 
supplied via one single network, especially in the telecommunication sector. 
Due to this fact the criterion of the “hit and run entry” is loosing its former 
importance. 
• Finally, the precondition for a market being contestable is that it is possible for 
a potential competitor to access the market before the established supplier is 
able to bring his prices down.30 
 
Summarized, the theory of contestable, stable markets suggests that even if there is 
only one supplier, the supplier may be forced to act as if there was competition.31 
2.4 Irreversible cost as justification for regulatory intervention 
If the above conditions are fulfilled, the market is contestable; due to this fact a 
natural modern monopoly will produce cost-effectively and will set out prices which 
cover the costs. Accordingly, if no network specific market power exists, no need for 
                                            
27 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 10. 
28 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 10. 
29 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 11. 
30 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 12. 
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regulatory intervention would arise even if only one independent supplier would offer 
a service based on the subadditivity of the cost function.32 Beside that, irreversible 
costs result in an asymmetry between dominant suppliers and potential competitors 
because the dominant supplier invested in a network and the construction cost do not 
influence the service prices anymore but a potential competitor has to decide if he will 
make this investment.33 If there are such “sunk costs”, the theory of the contestability 
of the markets, which points out that those markets with monopolies or oligopolies act 
automatically like markets with competition, is no longer supportable. It is not feasible 
for a supplier with irreversible investment cost to get access to the network is a “hit 
and run entry”, so, as a consequence, the first mover will get market power due to the 
fact that there is no competition in this field.34 As a result of this, the first mover has 
the power of strategic margins on the market because he is able to reduce the prices 
over a long term. A potential competitor might be deterred by that behaviour and may 
not be willing to enter the market. Thus, irreversible cost can be a barrier to a market 
entry or exit, because the only way to avoid this cost will be to not access the 
market.35 The access to the market will become unprofitable for potential 
competitors, and due to this the possibilities for disciplining the market power will be 
restricted. The situation of a combination of the subadditivity of the costs function and 
irreversible costs, in which the development of a competition will be not possible, has 
to be described as an unbreakable natural modern monopoly, the so called 
“bottleneck resource”.36 In the past, a huge average of sunk cost from the 
construction of networks was responsible for the assumption that one big supplier is 
able to ensure a natio wide service better than a few smaller suppliers.37 Also based 
on this assumption is the necessity of cross-subsidies to offset the profit in one area 
against the loss in another. Due to the above mentioned facts and that most of the 
suppliers of network services are state owned companies, it was assumed that 
telecommunication sector was an excepted area where the state owned companies 
were protected from competition.38 
                                            
32 William J. Baumol ´Constable markets: an uprising in the theory of industrie´ (1982) American Economic Review 1 at 3. 
33 Rupert Windisch Privatisierung natürlicher Monopole im Bereich von Bahn, Post und Telekommunikation (1987) 61. 
34 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 12. 
35 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 12. 
36 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 13. 
37 Rupert Windisch Privatisierung natürlicher Monopole im Bereich von Bahn, Post und Telekommunikation (1987) 61. 
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2.5 Loss of significance of the theory of the natural monopoly in 
the telecommunication sector 
The model described above of the “natural monopoly” has one fundamental 
weakness: all factors, like the “economies of scale” or the “economies of scope” 
reflect a “snapshot” (a short moment in time), and they are not able to react to 
technological changes or a demand for expansion in the network.39 A dynamic 
perspective is crucial for the determination of a natural monopoly, especially in a 
rapidly changing market like the telecommunication market. From this point of view, it 
will be possible to determine whether changing factors will be partly able to cancel a 
natural monopoly by cancelling the significant economies of scale and scope in the 
market.40 Due to this, the possibility must be taken into consideration that a natural 
monopoly may disappear. Indicators for this disappearance are the demand for 
growth and the reduction of costs through technological progress.41  
Most countries worldwide had state owned telecommunications companies based on 
the theory of a natural monopoly without any competition in this sector. Due to the 
possibility that different factors are able to cancel the status of a natural monopoly the 
discussion whether it will be necessary to open up the telecommunication market for 
competition arises. The precondition for the telecommunication market to remain a 
natural monopoly was that competition in this market will not be able to come up with 
innovations for the supplementation of products or the reduction of costs in this field. 
Furthermore, one must take into consideration that the economic meaning of network 
structures has matured immensely in the past years. Also, the competition theoretical 
consideration changed during recent years based on a high investment potential and 
the enormous technical progress.42 Especially new technological developments in the 
telecommunication market are able to burst the characterising economies of scale 
and economies of scope in the field of the conventional telephone network. Due to 
this fact it is arguable whether the telecommunication network can continue to be 
described as a natural monopoly.  
                                            
39 Rupert Windisch Privatisierung natürlicher Monopole im Bereich von Bahn, Post und Telekommunikation (1987) 56. 
40 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 14. 
41 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 15. 
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A characteristic of the natural monopoly is its temporary character, and for that 
reason, the continued existence of a monopoly needs to be investigated from time to 
time. This investigation is for a network which, like the telecommunication network, 
supplies multiple products, more complex because of their economies of scope than 
for a network, which supplies only one product.43 For this dissertation it is sufficient to 
give an overview of common appraisals of the question whether the 
telecommunication sector may continue to be described as a natural monopoly.  
Clear indicators for the disappearance of natural monopolies are the fundamental 
technological progress which influenced the economies of scale and scope and the 
demand for growth.44 The development in the telecommunication market is 
characterised by a strong demand for growth and structural changes due to new 
consumer preferences. The demand for growth in the telecommunication sector is 
based on the increased real income levels in the industrial states and technological 
development in this field. Especially the development of the cellular mobile telephony 
created new market sectors in the telecommunication field.45 Furthermore, the 
convergence between telecommunication, computer, radio and television technology 
resulted in cost reduction and the combination of consumer demands in traditional 
separated markets.46 Apart from the development of the cellular mobile telephony, 
the internet market strongly influenced the telecommunication market. In this field the 
supplier who supplies networks only will have the smallest margins and the supplier 
who is able to offer the network, internet access, the content aggregator and the 
content originator, will have the highest one.47  
Notwithstanding the huge changes in the field of the technology data transfer, e.g. 
the change from analogue to digital or from wired to wireless transfer, there are still 
some economies of scale and scope for the wired network structure.48 On does not 
need to explain in more detail that an established network operator just has to 
replace the old wired network with a more efficient one whilst a new operator has 
firstly to invest the cost to build up a network. As long as the wired technology 
dominates the telecommunication market there will be a market power problem due 
                                            
43 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 16. 
44 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 17. 
45  Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 18. 
46  Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 18. 
47  Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 18. 
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to the theory of contestable markets.49 However, these economies of scale and 
scope for the wired network structure, today, are graded by the development of 
wireless technologies.  
Furthermore one needs to take into consideration that the demand for growth and the 
technological change can also create new natural monopolies.50 It might be possible 
that an ISDN-network supplier will create economies of scale and scope which are 
factors in favour of the creation of a natural monopoly.51 The technology changes 
during the last years, in any event, make it obvious that there are no more economies 
of scale and scope in the telecommunication market – the former natural monopoly is 
gone and also the creation of new monopolies as described above was noticed 
based on the establishment of competition in this field. Furthermore, the demand for 
expansion and the technological improvements in the telecommunication sector allow 
the conclusion that the opening of this market for competition will bring more 
structural change and advantages for consumers of this network. In addition, the 
telecommunication market is subject to international competition and due to this fact 
it is necessary to create national competition in this field. 
                                            
49 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 19. 
50 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 19. 
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CHAPTER 3 SECTOR SPECIFIC REGULATION VERSUS 
COMPETITION LAW -WHAT APPROACH WILL 
BE THE BEST? 
The above mentioned can be summarised as follows: In the past, network industries 
were national monopolies. In this matter the duty of the national authorities was to 
guarantee acceptable prices for the benefit of the offering services and to fulfil the 
public service obligation. Due to these facts, competition issues were completely 
absent in such networks. In a study for the European Commission in 1999, the 
Institut d´Economie Industrielle noted: ´…In the previous monopolized environments, 
the main economics issues were the setting of a proper price structure, the 
encouragement of cost efficiency, the extraction of monopoly rents and the protection 
of the company’s long term investments against expropriation. Antitrust policy, with 
its focus on competition, had little to contribute...´.52  
In the beginning of the eighties of the 20th century a liberalisation process started in 
the network sectors, especially in the telecommunication sector. The goal of this 
process was to ensure a change from a natural monopoly in which 
telecommunication services was exclusively supplied by state owned operators to a 
market, in which competition will bring more technological improvements and 
advantages for the custom rs in the service and cost matters.53 A reason for this 
change was the recognition of the so called “spill over - effect“, which means that 
competition in the telecommunication market is affecting the turnover and efficiency 
in other economic sectors through an improved telecommunication services.54  
Hence, the common economic growth in a country will benefit from a liberalised 
telecommunication market. The liberalisation process has to observe the economic 
specifics in the network. Competition is commonly defined by Merriam Webster as 
´…the effort of two or more parties acting independently to secure the business of a 
third party by offering the most favourable terms…´.55  The goal of competition is the 
                                            
52 European Economy (European Commission Directorate-General for economic and financial affairs) ´Liberalisation of network  
    industries – Economic implications and main policy issues´ (1999) No 4 105. Available at  
    http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication8093_en.pdf [Accessed 11 November 2008]. 
53 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 22. 
54 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 22. 
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development of new products, services and technologies to ensure a greater 
selection and better products for consumers combined with lower prices.56 Bearing in 
mind that there was no competition in the telecommunication sector, the adoption of 
the competition law alone is not sufficiently appropriate to implement competition in 
this field. The competition law on its own regulates competition matters and in so far 
an established competition in different business fields is required. Therefore an 
adoption of the competition law in a field where no competition is established is not 
possible. No competition was established in the telecommunication sector and due to 
this fact the question is whether there was a need for sector specific regulation to 
ensure the successful transition from a natural monopoly to a competition orientated 
network.  
Despite the positive effects which will arise out of competition, the gap between 
effective and legal measures to open up a natural monopoly and make way for 
competition is still significant. Due to this, the question arose, as to whether 
regulation or competition policy will be the best tool to oversee the liberalisation 
process of network industries and to what extent competition policies and sector-
specific regulation were complements or substitutes.57 In this matter economists and 
lawyers with an expertise in network industries hold different views on the necessity 
of sector specific regulation to establish competition. According to some, special 
characteristics of a network, e.g. the historically grown telecommunication network, 
make it necessary to introduce and maintain specific regulatory measures, as for 
others competition law is sufficient.58  
3.1 What is the difference between sector-specific regulation and 
the competition policy approach?  
The change from a former natural monopoly to an open sector for competition is 
significantly influenced by liberalisation measures and technical innovation, and the 
nature of public intervention has to be redefined in this context. In this context, the 
                                            
56 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Competition#Economics_and_business [Accessed 11 November 2008]. 
57 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´  
   (2006) 4.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008].     
58 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´  
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question is of primary importance as to what extent the removal of sector specific 
regulations, e.g. ex ante regulations, has created less damage than the former 
natural monopoly-structured sector. To clarify the situation it is useful to give 
examples of the differences between sector specific regulation and competition law. 
At the end an answer to the question can be given whether the sector specific 
regulation might be of just a temporary character. 
3.1.1 Ex ante versus ex post approach 
Sector specific regulatory measures, e.g. price regulations, rely on an ex ante 
prescriptive business conduct. Ex ante regulations are always forward looking and in 
this context different technology business developments and place restrictions on 
certain products have to be observed by the regulatory authorities.59 This approach 
makes it possible for a supplier to foresee the risk which has to be taken within 
different investments. The competition approach, on the other hand, is an ex post 
approach without any restriction for a possible future development. Only the current 
situation combined with former experiences will be regulated. Here, however, is an 
unforeseen risk for a supplier to be penalized if the business is found to abuse a 
dominant market power and needs to observe restrictions after investments were 
made.60 Due to the different approaches, the amount and nature of information on 
which the different measures are based are different. Within an ex post approach the 
information required is less than within an ex ante approach. To make a decision or a 
new regulation based on competition law only, it is only necessary to assess the 
business conduct after the allegation and only in the light of what is known at the time 
of investigation. By contrast, an ex ante decision or regulation needs more 
information to get general, detailed and updated information in sector specific 
matters.61 
One of the most important issues in network industries is the pricing for 
interconnection among competitors. A new supplier in network industries needs 
interconnection to the network to be able to offer their services. Just in the matter of 
                                            
59 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´  
   (2006) 6.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008]. 
60 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´   
(2006) 6.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008]. 
61 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
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the price policy it seems to be better to set out an ex post regulation as to define with 
an ex ante approach what price policy might become unfair in the future. However, 
despite the price regulation itself, new entrants need clear information on the 
interconnection charge and its future evolution. Only with this information they will be 
able to make huge investments and observe the economic risk. In other words: with 
ex ante regulation measures network industries can be opened up for competition 
and ex post competition rules ensure that the business can be operate.62 
Hence, to establish competition in a formerly monopolistic network, sector specific 
regulation is needed this can be amended into regular competition rules after the 
successful implementation of competition in the network. 
3.1.2 Structural design of acting authorities 
The responsibility of competition authorities on the one hand is to intervene and to 
impose sanctions or penalties for the abuse of a dominant market power, cartels or 
mergers in any industry.63 This approach is a horizontal one and requires a very high 
standard of expertise and decisions on very different markets with different structures 
and technologies. On the other hand, the regulatory authorities act only in specific 
sectors like the telecommunication sector, which is the so-called vertical approach. 
Here, decisions require sector-specific knowledge. The different structure of the 
acting authorities requires a different category of employee with different 
qualifications. Due to the fact that of a required sector-specific knowledge is required 
within the regulatory authorities, increased numbers of engineers will be employed by 
them. Furthermore, the employees in regulatory authorities are mostly nominated by 
government. There will be the risk that this authority will be affected by industrial 
policy consideration in favour of national economics or social interest.64 However, 
especially social interest, like implementing network connection in rural areas or other 
Universal Service obligations, are also helpful to establish competition in the network 
sector. By contrast, in the competition authorities the decisional power will be more in 
the hands of lawyers. However, lawyers will be required for regulatory and 
                                            
62 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
(2006) 7.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008]. 
63 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
(2006) 7.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008]. 
64 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
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competition decision. The main differences between these two authorities is that the 
decision-making power in the regulatory authority lies in the hand of policy maker 
rather than courts, and the decision making by the competition authorities has power 
vested in courts as well as the two different approaches – the vertical (regulatory 
authorities) and the horizontal (competition authorities).65  
To break a former monopolised network for competition, both structures are 
necessary. The regulatory authorities are able to make sector-specific decisions and 
the competition authorities are necessary to prevent the creation of a new dominant 
market power. Once again: In the beginning of the liberalisation process the 
regulatory decisions will be more important and afterwards the decision making by 
the competition authorities will be become more valuable to guarantee the 
competition created in this field. 
3.1.3 Legal Remedies 
Competition law and sector specific regulation also differ in the matter of remedies 
due to institutional competencies and human and technical resources.66 Competition 
law remedies are structural without the requirement of future extensive monitoring 
and normally addressed at a specific conduct. By contrast, regulatory remedies are 
detailed conduct remedies which require extensive monitoring, e.g. the conditions to 
mandate the provisions of certain services.67 In other words:  Regulatory remedies 
are more specific than the competition law alone. In the context of creating an open 
market with competition, the sector specific regulation will help to establish the 
competition. Whilst this goal is in the process of being attained, these regulations 
have to be replaced by the non-specific competition rules. 
                                            
65 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
(2006) 8.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008]. 
66 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
(2006) 9.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008]. 
67 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
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3.2 Advantages and disadvantages of a sector specific regulation 
and the competition law 
An ex ante as well as an ex post regulation has advantages and disadvantages. The 
sector-specific ex ante regulation has the following advantages: This form of 
regulation is transparent based on rules clearly set out in advance; thus damage, 
arising from an anti-competitive behaviour, can be avoided by anticipating and 
providing for it. Furthermore, a dispute resolution can be achieved easily through a 
decision of the regulatory authority. On the other hand, there are various 
disadvantages. A sector specific regulation used to impose a high informational 
requirement on the regulators and often uses the “perfect competition model” as a 
benchmark which can lead to unnecessary or excessive intervention. Due to 
excessive regulation of all effects a sector specific regulation may prevent a specific 
effect. Also unforeseen distortions can be introduced in the operation of the market 
and an asymmetric regulation can encourage service providers to focus on exploiting 
opportunities for arbitrage.68 
Contrary to an ex post competition law regulation, forms of conduct that are specified 
in advance are prohibited. Another advantage of this regulation is that the 
competition law attempts to only stop conduct that is shown to be harmful to the 
social good, and temporary departures from competition benchmarks (e.g. due to 
innovation) are not penalized without investigation. Due to the fact that the 
competition law regulation applies the same rules for all competition sectors without 
any differences a consistent outcome across all sectors can be achieved. But there 
are also disadvantages which are arising by using competition law rules. An ex post 
regulation only ameliorates harm to competition but does not prevent it. Furthermore, 
it can be difficult and cost intensive to secure the information for enforcing 
competition law rules and these general rules may be unsuitable for identifying and 
penalizing anti-competitive conduct specifics to a certain market like the 
telecommunication market.69 
                                            
68 http://www.ictregulationtoolkit.org/en/Section.1677.html [Accessed 21 November 2008]. 
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Seeing that both forms of regulation have advantages and disadvantages the right 
balance has to be found to successfully open up a former national monopoly like the 
telecommunication market for competition. 
3.3 What is the best approach to open up the telecommunication 
market for competition?  
All the examples above demonstrate that a sector specific regulation have a 
temporary character. They will be replaced by the existing competition rules as 
competition becomes more effective in the specific field. The instrument of sector 
specific regulation has to be kept to a strict minimum and should o ly be used where 
a market failure arises. They have to be used for example to discipline companies to 
be more efficient, to limit the potential of unfair rent or to rebalance the price structure 
in the specific market.70 As soon as the former monopolised network industries 
achieve a competition market outcome which is fair to the rest of the economy, it is 
necessary to abolish the sector-specific regulatory bodies and hand the supervision 
over to the competition law only.71 Especially the telecommunication market is a good 
example of an ex monopoly moving towards to an open market with competition. 
                                            
70 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
(2006) 10.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008]. 
71 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
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CHAPTER 4 THE EUROPEAN APPROACH TO OPEN UP 
THE ELECOMMUNICATION MARKET FOR 
COMPETITION  
The member states of the European Union opened their telecommunication markets 
up for competition really effectually through the use of different and efficient 
liberalisation and harmonisation measures during the last years. Furthermore, each 
member state of the European Community established the competition in this field 
under the same legislative conditions established by the European Commission. The 
European Community itself is not able to set out legislative rules for the member 
states but its organ (European Commission, European Parliament and the European 
Council), based on the Treaty of Amsterdam, are authorized to set out different legal 
rules of different degrees of intensity in exactly defined fields. One of these fields is 
“competition matters”. The most important instruments for setting out legal rules are 
both the “self executing” rules known as “Regulations”, which affect the member 
states directly, and the “Directives”, which have been fulfilled by the member states in 
their country through their own national legislation in a specific timeframe. 
Furthermore, the organs of the European Community can decree 
“Recommendations” which the member states have to observe, but not to adopt. To 
reach the goal of the creation of an internal European market, most member states of 
the European Community also transact these “Recommendations” in their national 
legislative. Finally, the organs of the European Community can act through 
“Decisions” or “Resolutions” which bind the recipient directly without any transaction 
into national law.  
The liberalisation process of the telecommunication market in the European 
Community was focused on two broad themes: The liberalisation measures have 
resulted in new regulation permitting competition in a former national monopoly, while 
the harmonisation measures have focussed on a design to ensure consistency in the 
regulatory structure in the telecommunication sector across the member states.72 
                                            
72 Chris Doyle ´Local Loop unbundling and regulatory risk´ (2000) 1 Journal of Network Industries 33 at 33. Available at 
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In the following the most important measures of the European Community to open 
the telecommunication market up for competition will be shown in an overview. 
4.1 Overview of the “old regulatory framework” measures of the 
European Community to open up the telecommunication sector 
for competition 
In brief, all liberalisation and harmonisation measures of the European Community 
have the objective to induce competition in prices, creating incentives to lower 
production and to increase product innovation.73 Furthermore, the legal and 
regulatory framework designed by the European Community will also allow network 
industries to operate more efficiently by changing market structures as reforms are 
progressively implemented. 
In the early eighties of the last century, the European Community started to liberalise 
the telecommunication market in the member states. In 1984, the European 
Commission initiated a first phase with the aim to move policy in the 
telecommunication sector forward to established common development lines for an 
internal market in the telecommunication sector. However, this phase was 
characterized particularly through common research. 
The second phase of the European Community politics to open up the 
telecommunication sector for competition was based on the “Green Paper on the 
Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services and 
Equipment” (thereafter referred to as “Green Paper”) which was published in 1987.74 
As a guideline, the “Green Paper” pursued the aim of disbanding the state-owned 
telecommunications companies as a national monopoly step by step. Here, “Green 
Paper” differentiates between the following 3 fields: terminal equipment, 
telecommunication services and telecommunication network, which all have to be 
completely liberalised in the next years. In addition, the “Green Paper” had the aim to 
implement a higher degree of harmonisation in the European Community through 
                                            
73 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´ 
(2006) 4.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008]. 
74 European Communities: Towards a Dynamic European Economy. Green Paper on the Development of the Common Market 
for Telecommunications Services and Equipment. COM (87) 290 final, 30 June 1987.  Available at http://aei.pitt.edu/1159/  
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using the opportunities offered by a single internal market in the telecommunication 
sector. To achieve these aims the European Community decided to set out different 
legal measures in the following field: 
 
• Liberalisation of the telecommunication market through cancellation of specific 
or exclusive rights for telecommunication suppliers in the member states; 
• Harmonisation of the telecommunication market through attaining similar legal 
prevailing conditions in accordance with the foundation of a telecommunication 
network and in accordance with the telecommunication service;  
• Safeguard an equal and fair competition through application of the community 
competition law in the member states; and 
• Safeguard a universal service in this matter. 
 
All these measures are summarised under the term of the “the old regulatory 
framework”. They are the first measures which were put into place by the European 
community to open up the telecommunication sector for competition. 
 
The most important liberalisation measures of the European Community in this phase 
were, amongst others: 
 
• The “Commission Directive on competition in the markets in  
telecommunications terminal equipment”75 which contains the responsibility of 
the member states to withdraw any special or exclusive rights to import, 
market, connect, bring into service and maintain telecommunications terminal 
equipment. 
• The “Service Directive”76 which limited the national telecommunication 
monopolies to the “voice telephony service” as a commercial provision for the 
                                            
75  Commission Directive on 16 May 1988 on competition in the markets in telecommunications equipment (88/301/EEC)    
     Available at  
     http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=31988L0301&model=guichett&lg=en 
[Accessed 05 December 2008]. 
76 Commission Directive 90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services  Available  
     at http://eur- 
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31990L0388&model=guichett 
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public and to the network.77 The remaining exclusive or specific rights of 
national monopolies in this matter have to be abolished by the member state 
within a specific timeframe. Especially the “Service Directive” was amended by 
a few other Directives in this context. One important Directive which amended 
the “Service Directive” was the “Mobile Directive”.78 Within this Directive 
exclusive and special rights in the mobile sector have to be disestablished by 
the member states. 
• The “Cable Directive”79  permitted as a liberalisation measure multi-media 
telecommunication services to be tendered over cable television network; in 
other words: The Directive requires the member states to allow the cable 
television network to be used for all telecommunication services with the 
exception of the “voice telephony service”.  
• The “Full Competition Directive”80 contained the obligation for the member 
states to cancel the remaining national monopoly for using a “voice telephony 
service” and to provide the telecommunication network. Furthermore, the 
member states had the obligation to set out a range of provisions addressing 
licensing, universal service, interconnection and numbering until January 
1998.  
 
The most important harmonisation measures of the European Community in this 
phase were, inter alia: 
 
• The harmonisation measures of the European legislature were summed up 
under the title “1998 Regulatory Package”, which included harmonisation 
                                            
77  Article 2  Commission Directive 90/388/EEC. 
78  Commission Directive 96/2/EC of 16 January 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to mobile and personal 
communications Available at http://eur- 
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31996L0002&model=guichett 
[Accessed 12 December 2008]. 
79  Commission Directive 95/51 EC of 18 October 1995 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the abolition of the 
restriction on the use of cable television networks for the provision of already liberalized telecommunication services Available at 
http://eur- 
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=31995L0051&model=guichett 
[Accessed 12 December 2008]. 
80 Commission Directive 96/19/EC of 13 March 1996 amending Directive 90/388/EEC with regard to the implementation of full 
competition in the  telecommunication  markets Available at http://eur- 
lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31996L0019&model=guichett 
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measures in the field of open network provisions (ONP), licenses, radio 
frequencies and the so called “local loop”. The most important harmonisation 
measure in this package, amongst others, is the “Open Network Provisions 
(ONP) Framework Directive”81. With this Directive, a dualistic regulation 
system was established which included liberalisation measures followed by 
harmonisation measures. The aim of the “ONP Framework Directive” was to 
ensure the access to the public telecommunications networks and 
telecommunication services in the whole community efficiently in accordance 
with the harmonised conditions.82 
• Based on the “ONP Framework Directive”, the acting organ of the European 
Community developed the so called “Green Paper on liberalisation of 
infrastructure part II”83 in 1995.  This paper was the reason for a number of 
measures to liberalise and harmonise the European telecommunication sector 
with the aim to fulfil the goals set out. The “Green Paper on liberalisation of 
infrastructure part II” includes, amongst others, the following aims: 
o Establishment of “National Regulatory Authorities” (thereafter referred 
as to NRA’s) which have to ensure that the historic regulatory functions 
of a national monopoly are vested in independent bodies and the 
regulatory function is separate from activities associated with ownership 
or control. Furthermore, the NRA’s have to ensure that the policy of the 
European Commission on the telecommunication market are adopted in 
the member states. 
o In the field of licensing, the “Green Paper on liberalisation of 
infrastructure part II” contains the procedure for the granting of 
authorizations and licenses of communication services and networks by 
the member states. To create an internal market, a system of speedy, 
transparent and effective licensing for communication services and 
networks is necessary. 
                                            
81 Commission Directive 90/387/EC of 28th June 1990 on the establishment of the Internal Market for telecommunications 
services through the implementation of Open Network Provision Available at  
    http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/legreg/docs/90387eec.html [Accessed 12 December 2008]. 
82  Article 1 Commission Directive 90/387/EC. 
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o The “Green Paper on liberalisation of infrastructure part II” for the first 
time pointed out measures in the field of interconnection. An 
interconnection framework is necessary because new operators have to 
rely on the networks to deliver transit or terminate traffic from and to 
their costumers. In the European Community the regulation in this field 
starts with the premise that interconnection is a matter for commercial 
negotiation. However, there is a key-policy objective of regulation 
focusing on an end-to-end interoperability for telecommunication 
services in the Community.  In accordance with this, the interconnection 
framework ensured generally that operators have a basic right and 
obligation to bargain interconnection. Furthermore, the policy of the 
European Commission will achieve that operators with a significant 
market power are obliged to agree to the interconnection terms and to 
meet all reasonable requests to access to their network. 
o Finally, the “Green Paper on liberalisation of infrastructure part II” 
contains measures for a European standard in the field of 
telecommunication, like universal service and being in accordance with 




4.2 Overview of the “new regulatory framework” measures of the 
European Community to open up the telecommunication sector 
for competition 
After the aims of the “old regulatory framework” were reached, the European 
Community developed a “new regulatory framework” based on the “Communications 
Review”84 of 1999. This “new regulatory framework” includes measures which ensure 
                                            
84  The 1999 Communications Review for electronic communications infrastructure and associated services Com 1999/539   
     Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the  
     Committee of the Regions - Towards a new framework for Electronic Communications infrastructure and associated services  
     Available at http://ec.europa.eu/archives/ISPO/infosoc/telecompolicy/review99/review99en.pdf [Accessed 12 December  
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a transition to a free competition with fewer barriers in the European 
telecommunication sector. Within the “new regulatory framework” the regulatory 
approach is based on competition law principles, the existence of market power and 
the possibility of abuse of dominant positions in the telecommunication sector. 
Furthermore, two fundamental issues are covered by the new framework: Firstly, the 
framework which identifies the markets to be regulated and, secondly, the operators 
with a significant market power are identified on which the sector specific regulation 
obligations are imposed.85 Finally, after a successful implementation of competition in 
the telecommunication sector, the sector specific regulation has to be replaced by the 
European competition law. Due to the fact that the telecommunication market is a 
large, dynamically developed and unpredictable market, the remaining sector specific 
regulations must cover all possibilities of an electronic communication infrastructure 
and associated services in a consistent method.86 The aims of all liberalisation and 
harmonisation Directives which were based on the “new regulatory framework” can 
be summarized as following: 
 
• Simplification of the regulation scope for the telecommunication sector 
• Establishment of convergence o  the telecommunications, media and 
information technology sector 
• Transfer from an ex ante regulation (sector specific regulation) to an ex-post 
regulation (competition law) by using the European competition rules 
• More harmonisation through application of the European legal scope in the 
member states 
 
Within the “new regulatory framework” of the European Community there is one 
liberalisation measure which has to be emphasised. The “Commission Directive on 
competition in the markets for electronic communication networks and services”87 
has the sole aim to establish the new regulatory concept, which means to ensure the 
transmission of sector specific regulation to competition law.  
                                            
85 Pierre-André Buigues `Competition policy versus sector-specific regulation in the network  industries – The EU experience´  
    (2006) 12.  Available at http://www.unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/c2clp_ige7p14_en.pdf [Accessed 15 November 2008] 
86  Status Report on European Union Electronic Communication Policy  Available at 
     http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/infosoc?telecompolicy/tcatatus.htm [Accessed 15 December 2008]. 
87  Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of September 2002 on competition in the markets for electronic communication networks 
and services Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_249/l_24920020917en00210026.pdf [Accessed 15 
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In the field of harmonisation the European Community issued, amongst others, five 
important Directives within the new regulatory framework: 
 
• The “Directive on a common regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services”, the so called “Framework Directive”, 
has the aim to establish a harmonised framework for the regulation of 
electronic communication services, electronic communication networks, 
associated facilities and associated services.88 This Directive specifically 
contains rules for the responsibilities of NRA’s in the member states and how 
they have to work.89 These responsibilities can be summarised as 
improvement of competition in the telecommunication sector within an 
establishment of an internal market which observes the interest of the 
European citizen. Furthermore, the “Framework-Directive” contains specific 
regulation for parts of the telecommunication sector like licensing, frequencies 
and numbering.90 The most important regulations contains Art 14 – 16 of the 
Framework-Directive. These Articles determine which operators have to be 
classified as such with a “significant market power” and therefore, as a 
common principle, they are subject to a specific sector ex ante regulation.  An 
operator has a significant market power if, ´…either individually or jointly with 
others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is to say a position of 
economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent 
independently of competitors, customers and ultimately consumers…´.91 
Furthermore, to prevent an abuse of vertical acting operator, i.e. an operator 
which is also acting on closely related markets, the “Framework-Directive” 
pointing out that if this operator ´...has a significant market power on a specific 
market, it may also be deemed to have significant market power on a closely 
related market, where the links between the two markets are such as to allow 
the market power held in one market to be leveraged into the other 
                                            
88  Article 1 Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive) Available at  
     http://www.euroblind.org/fichiersGB/com200221.htm [Accessed 15 December 2008]. 
89  Article 8 ff Directive 2002/21/EC. 
90  Bernd Holznagel and Christoph Enaux and Christian Nienhaus Telekommunikationsrecht 2ed (2006) 314. 











CHAPTER 4: The European approach to open up the elecommunication market for competition
28
market…´.92 This definition of a significant market power is closely related to 
the definition in this connection contained in the European competition law, 
Article 81 and 82 Treaty on European Union and also the judgments of the 
European Court of Justice are applicable here.93 Despite the fact that the term 
of significant market power is the same within the European sector specific 
regulation for the telecommunication market and the European competition 
law, there is one essential difference: the NRA’s have to make an ex ante 
decision about the significant market power and to observe the future market 
development. By contrast, the decision by the competition law authorities is an 
ex post one. For the determination of an operator with a significant market 
power in accordance with the “Framework-Directive” two successive 
procedures were developed: the market definition procedure and the market 
analysis procedure which have to be used by the NRA’s.94 The European 
Commission developed the “Commission guidelines on market analysis and 
the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory 
framework for electronic communication networks and services”95 (thereafter 
referred to as “Guideline”). In accordance with this “Guideline” not only the 
market share is the only criterion to determine an operator as one with a 
significant market power. Also criteria like a technological advantage or the 
control over not replaceable infrastructure have to be observed within the 
procedure. Despite that, if an operator holds a market share of over 50 per 
cent on a market which has to be sector specific ex ante regulated, he has to 
be declared as one with a significant market power without any more 
investigation.96 Such a sector specific ex ante regulation is only allowed for 
markets ´…which may be such as to justify the imposition of regulatory 
obligations set out in specific Directives…´.97 The determination on which 
markets a sector specific ex ante regulation can be used is incumbent on the 
European Commission. In this connection the Commission published the 
                                            
92 Article 14 subparagraph 3 Directive 2002/21/EC. 
93 Bernd Holznagel, Christoph Enaux and Christian Nienhaus Telekommunikationsrecht 2ed (2006) 315. 
94 Article 15 and Article 16 Directive 2002/21/EC. 
95 Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (2002/C 165/03) Available at  
    http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2002:165:0006:0031:EN:PDF [Accessed 18 December 2008]. 
96 Bernd Holznagel and Christoph Enaux and Christian Nienhaus Telekommunikationsrecht 2ed (2006) 315. 
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“Commission Recommendation of 11/02/2003 On Relevant Product and 
Service Markets within the electronic communication sector susceptible to ex-
ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communication networks and services”98 (thereafter referred to as 
“Recommendation”). This “Recommendation” contains eighteen different 
markets in two different levels like the access to the public telephone network 
on the retail level or the access to the public telephone network on the 
wholesale level.99 The European Commission will control this 
“Recommendation” periodically and depends on the development of the 
market also amended. As mentioned above, a Recommendation does not 
contain responsibilities for member states but Art. 16 of the “Framework-
Directive” states that the NRA’s shall to be carrying out these 
Recommendations.100 The NRA’s have to fulfil the responsibilities contained in 
the “Framework-Directive” and to determine where a sector specific ex ante 
regulation will be necessary. The authorities, under observation of the 
Recommendations und Guidelines and national specials, have to investigate, 
which markets need to be regulated by a sector specific regulation. 
Afterwards, the results have to be notified by the European Commission which 
has the vetoing power over all decisions.101 In a next step the NRA’s have to 
analyse if effective competitions are established in the particular 
telecommunication markets.102 Within a negative definition an effective 
competition is not established, if on this market one or multiple operators with 
a significant market power are acting. The NRA’s have to find at least one 
capable ex ante regulation for these operators to establish competition in this 
market.103 These regulations may have an intensity which may extend from 
                                            
98 Commission Recommendation of 11/02/2003 On Relevant Product and Service Markets within the electronic communication 
sector susceptible to ex-ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the  
    Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services Available at  
    http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/topics/telecoms/regulatory/maindocs/documents/recomen.pdf [Accessed 15  
    December 2008]. 
99 Annex Commission Recommendation of 11/02/2003. 
100  Article 16 subparagraph 1 Directive 2002/21/EC. 
101 Article 15 Directive 2002/21/EC. 
102 Article 16 Directive 2002/21/EC. 
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basic transparent conditions to detailed guidelines for all network related 
considerations.104  
• The “Authorisation Directive”105 aiming to implement an internal market in 
electronic communications networks and services through the harmonisation 
and simplification of authorization rules and conditions.106 
• The “Access Directive”107 , which aims to establish a regulatory framework for 
the relationship between suppliers of networks and services.108 Furthermore, 
this Directive clarifies when an operator, who is a dominant market power, has 
the obligation to contract with a potential competitor. In this connection the 
Directive will be discussed later.109 
                                            
104 Bernd Holznagel, Christoph Enaux and Christian Nienhaus Telekommunikationsrecht 2ed (2006) 318. 
105  Directive 2002/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on the authorization of electric  
      communications network and services (Authorisation Directive) Available at  
      http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00210032.pdf [Accessed 15 December 2008]. 
106 Article subparagraph 1 Directive 2002/20/EC. 
107 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and  interconnection of,  
     electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) Available at  
      http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0019:EN:HTML [Accessed 15 December 2008].       
108 Article 1 subparagraph 1 Directive 2002/19/EC. 
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• The “Universal Service Directive”110 which aims to ensure the provision of a 
defined minimum set of services to all end-users at an affordable price in the 
member states through an equal and fair competition. 
• And finally, the “Directive on privacy and electronic communications”111 which 
aims to protect personal data and privacy for users of an electronic network 
and services of publicly available electronic communication services 
regardless of the technologies effectively used. 
4.3 Current “regulatory framework” of the European Community  
Today, the aims of the European Commission policy in the telecommunication market 
are the same as those which they pointed out in the “new regulatory framework” 
policy, as mentioned above. To achieve these aims, the European Commission 
primarily used the so-called “1998 regulatory package” as their basic instruments. In 
accordance with the enlargement of the Europe n Community in January 2007 by 
two member states, Bulgaria and Romania, “mid-term” challenges are discernible. 
Firstly, the correct and timeout implementation of the “new regulatory framework” by 
all 27 member states. Secondly, establishment of a procedure to handle the member 
states notice on operators with a “significant market power” and confiscation of 
uniform regulatory measures in the European Community. Thirdly, development of an 
European regulatory culture to harmonise application of community rules all over the 
internal market. And fi ally, extraction of the achievement of the different aims of the 
“new regulatory framework”, inter alia via well mapped out implementing measures, 
recommendations and guidelines.112 Furthermore, in accordance with the 
enlargement of the European Community, which began in 2004, the new member 
                                            
110  Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users rights  
      relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive)  
      Available at  
      http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_108/l_10820020424en00510077.pdf [Accessed 15 December 2008]. 
111  Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the processing of personal  
      data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (Directive on privacy and electronic  
      communications) Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_201/l_20120020731en00370047.pdf  
       [Accessed 15 December 2008]. 
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states have to achieve the aspiring European standard in the telecommunication 
sector.  
In order to create a functioning and effective internal market in the telecommunication 
sector, the European Commission will have to achieve the following aims in 
accordance with an ever changing market in the future: 
 
 
• Establish an effective market-orientated strategy in Europe’s internal market; 
• A more effective regulatory body; 
• Economisation of the market review procedure to make it faster; and 
• Protection of the single market through ensuring that the rules and remedies 
will be applied in all member states 
 
The European Commission understands that the telecommunication market changed 
due to their reforms as is apparent from the review proposal of 2007. The next reform 
steps will be, inter alia, the replacement of the sector specific regulation with common 
competition law. Regulatory efforts and resources will only be focusing on the sectors 
where they are most needed; the Commission aims to gain the greatest benefits for 
consumers, in the shortest possible time.113 
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CHAPTER 5 THE “ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE” IN 
THE EUROPEAN LAW AND ESPECIALLY ITS 
CONSEQUENCES FOR THE 
TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR 
All the liberalisation and harmonisation measures mentioned above are not able to 
ensure that a former monopolist will open up its infrastructure completely for 
competition. One needs to take into account that a former monopolist in the 
telecommunication sector still holds the networks to supply telecommunication 
services. The danger remains that new operators are not allowed to get access to the 
network or only under complicated circumstances – all this becomes a key-issue in 
the dualistic system of sector-specific regulation and competition law. The access to 
the network or other facilities is essential to establish competition in a former 
monopolist-dominated sector. The European Commission recognised this early and 
declared different Recommendations under which circumstances the European 
competition law will be applicable to bottleneck access next to the sector specific 
regulation in the telecommunication sector. These Recommendations clarify what 
facts will end up with a contravention against the European competition and anti-trust 
law. Especially the “Notice on the application of the competition rules to access 
agreements in the telecommunication sector”114 (thereafter referred to as “Access-
Notice”) and the “Access Directive”115 are important in this connection. Within this 
Access-Notice the relationship between the sector specific regulation and the 
competition law is defined in substantial detail. The main European competition rule 
in this connection is Art. 82 Treaty on European Union. This Article is aimed at 
preventing undertakings who hold a dominant position in a market from abusing that 
position. It provides that: 
 
                                            
114 Notice on the application of the competition rules to access agreements in the telecommunication sector  FRAMEWORK, 
      RELEVANT MARKETS AND PRINCIPLES (98/C 265/02) Available at 
      http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1998:265:0002:0028:EN:PD [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
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´…(1) Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the 
common market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with 
the common market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. 
(2) Such abuse may, in particular, consist of: 
 
(a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions; 
(b) Limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties 
of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial 
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts…´116 
 
Generally, Art 82 Treaty on European Union does not contain a prohibition that an 
operator with a significant market power or dominant market position, is not allowed 
to deny the access to their facilities or allow the access in connection with 
unwarranted high cost without any justification.117 If there is no economic alternative 
for the applied access, the aspiring new operator is not able to supply its services in 
the market. Accordingly, the establishment of competition in this field is not possible. 
However, the goal of an open competition orientated market cannot be attained at 
any cost. It must be clarified under which circumstances the former monopolist has to 
open up his facilities for competition and also some of his interests must be 
prevented. Thereafter, one needs to investigate under which circumstances an 
operator controls an essential facility and has to allow the access in the 
telecommunication sector under the European competition and anti-trust law.  
                                            
116 Article 82 of the EC Treaty (ex Article 86) Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/legislation/treaties/ec/art82_en.html  
     [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
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5.1 Necessity of special regulation to get access to an essential 
facility  
Due to the European system of economics and property, an operator who does not 
give assets to another operator – especially a competitive one – is not acting against 
the law.118 Accordingly, the assumption that such acting is contravening the 
European competition law needs a specific justification. An exception from the 
mentioned general rule exists for such operators who control essential facilities; 
without an access to it other operators are not able to act.  Especially new operators 
in the telecommunication sector do not own necessary facilities and for their market 
entrance they need to get access to the facilities from the former monopolist and 
established operator. Summarized, within the “Access-Notice” the European 
Commission describes an essential facility as a facility or infrastructure that is 
essential for reaching costumers and/or enabling competition to carry on their 
business, and which is unable to be replaced by any reasonable means.119 
Especially physical infrastructures like the cable network are contained in this 
definition. The criterion of the essentiality can also be used for network termination 
devices. Services in the telecommunication sector can only be supplied if the 
operator has access to the termination devices of the telecommunication network on 
which the consumer is connected. For this connection a so called “local loop” – a 
local infrastructure – is necessary which can be operated by the supplier or rented 
out by another supplier. This access can also be ensured with an operator of an 
interconnection, which has access to the network termination devices. Finally, such 
an access is also possible through another operator, who supplies the consumer as 
well. Furthermore, amongst the physical infrastructure, technical or consumer specific 
information, like the telephone directory or numbers, can be “essential” in terms of 
the definition mentioned.120 In this connection, an operator must have access to a 
public switched telecommunications network for supplying the same services as an 
established operator which is a main principle in the competition law of the 
                                            
118 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 166. 
119 section “essential facilities” 98/C 265/02. 
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telecommunication sector.121 For an effective competition and the development of 
new media-technologies and internet, the access to networks and services is 
important. If the access to such facilities is controlled by the established operator with 
the significant market power there is the risk that this operator abused its power. 
These operators are able to control the newly established competition in the way that 
they are using the bottlenecks for the network access to obtain an advantage in 
supplying services adverse to the competitors. To prevent this, there is a need for 
strict rules, which prevent that a former monopolist is able to use its advantage, 
grown from old monopoly rights, against new competitors.122 Due to this, it is 
possible, in exceptional circumstances, that an operator with an access to an 
essential facility has to work together with a competitor to establish competition in this 
specific field. Logically there is a stress ratio between the rights of the owner of an 
essential facility and protecting the new competitors from abusing of a monopoly 
related advantage. To resolve this situation, the “essential facilities doctrine” 
developed from the US American anti-trust law can be used as far as the doctrine is 
implemented in the European competition law.123 
5.2 The development of the “essential facilities doctrine” in the US 
American anti-trust law 
Similar to Europe, there is also a stress ratio between the public utility regulation and 
anti-trust law or competition law in the United States of America which is based on 
the different requirements of the prohibition of competition restriction and the 
instruction of the supervision of the economy.124  Regulations are defined by the 
market structure and the market behaviour through control of the access to the 
market, clear definition of prices and obligations to ensure the access for new 
competitors. Despite this specific regulation, the anti-trust law is still applicable in 
state-controlled economic sectors to prevent a private competition restriction. The 
                                            
121 Section “access to facilities” 98/C 265/02. 
122 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 168. 
123 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 168. 
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US-American anti-trust law is mentioned in different Acts, namely the Sherman 
Act125, the Clayton Act126 and the Federal Trade Commission Act127. 
The development of the “essential facilities doctrine” began with a road traffic law 
decision from the year 1912; in the matter of the U.S. v. Terminal Railroad 
Association of St. Louis. This decision was based mainly on the prohibition of a 
monopoly in accordance with Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This Section declares: 
´…Every person, who shall monopolise, or attempt to monopolise, or combine or 
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolise any part of the trade or 
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony...´. 
In accordance with the wording, Section 2 of the Sherman Act does not contain a 
specific prohibition of discrimination or a common rule about an abuse of a significant 
market power like Art. 82 Treaty on European Union contains. This Section prohibited 
the “monopolisation” which means the intention to create a monopoly and to use this 
position against other competitors, in other words: the competition has to result in the 
prevention of monopolies. Also, this approach does not reflect the content of Art. 82 
Treaty on European Union which does not prohibit a significant or dominant market 
power per se, but prohibits an abuse of this power. In this connection a monopoly or 
a significant market power is held by that operator who has the intention and the 
power to control prices or exclude competition. An important criterion for this intention 
is the size of the enterprise and the power of the monopoly.128 In accordance with 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act it is possible to assume the creation of a monopoly if 
an operator refuses to supply or does predatory pricing.  The US Supreme Court 
decided in U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis that, due to the fact that 
there were only one rail station and rail bridge in St. Louis, the unification of these 
railroad terminal systems by the Terminal Railroad Association in a joint operation 
shows the intention to prevent competition in this field and in so far it 
has to be declared as a prohibited act in accordance with Section 2 of the Sherman 
                                            
125 Sherman Antitrust Act, Act of July 2, 1890, Chap. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C., Sec. 1-t Available at  
     http://www.stolaf.edu/people/becker/antitrust/statutes/sherman.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
126 The Clayton Antitrust Act, Act of October 15, 1914 Chap. 323, 38 Stat. 730, 15 U.S.C., Sec. 12-27 Available at  
      http://www.stolaf.edu/people/becker/antitrust/statutes/clayton.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
127 Federal Trade Commission Act, Act of  September 26, 1914, Chap. 311, 38, Stat. 717-721, 15 U.S.C., Sec. 41-58 Available  
      at http://www.ftc.gov/ogc/ftcact.shtm [Accessed 20 December 2008). 
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Act.129  In this connection the rail station and rail bridge in St. Louis were “essential” 
because it was the possibility for other competitors to get access to the network 
system. The Terminal Railroad Association was obliged within this decision to 
prevent competitors with non-discriminatory access to their facilities. There were a lot 
of decisions based on the case of the U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. 
Louis. However, the case Associated Press v. US130 was specifically in this 
connection. Part of the decision was the question if there is a right for an access to a 
news agency. The US Supreme Court decided that also the refusal of non-physical 
access is a prohibited act in accordance with Section 2 of the Sherman Act. This 
decision is in so far problematic as far as the object was the access to the product 
“information”. An access to “information” means that the competitor can use it. By 
contrast, an access to a physical infrastructure is connected with an own act by the 
competitor before competition can be established.131 The Supreme Court decided 
that this specific news agency is an essential facility; the question whether other 
competitors, except for the plaintiff, have a right to get access to this news agency 
under the same condition was not answered. 132 
The first decision in the matter to get access to a network infrastructure was made in 
the case of Otter Tail Power Co. v. US.133 Otter Tail is a regional electricity operator, 
and competitors took legal action to get access to the electricity network to supply 
consumers in a downstream market. Due to geographical circumstances it was not 
possible to build a new network. Otter Tail did not allow the access to the network 
and the Supreme Court decided that acting in this manner is prohibited in terms of 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The highlight of this decision was that the Supreme 
Court pointed out for the first time that a criterion for an “essential facility” can also be 
the danger of the monopolising of a downstream market.134 Due to the fact that only 
the behaviour of Otter Tail was evaluated, different academical assignments 
                                            
129 U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis  224, U.S. 383, 405 (1912) Available at   
     http://supreme.justia.com/us/224/383/case.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
130 Associated Press v. United States 326 U.S. 1 (1945) Available at  http://supreme.justia.com/us/326/1/ [Accessed 20  
     December 2008]. 
131 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 171. 
132 U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St Louis  224 U.S. 383, 405 (1912) Available at   
     http://supreme.justia.com/us/224/383/case.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
133 Otter Tail Power Co. v. US  410 U.S. 366 (1973)  Available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/410/366/  [Accessed 20  
      December 2008] 
134 Otter Tail Power Co. v. US  410 U.S. 366 (1973)  Available at http://supreme.justia.com/us/410/366/  [Accessed 20  
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classified this case exactly not as an “essential facilities doctrine” case because a 
general access obligation to facilities with a monopolistic character was not 
established.135 
Despite the fact that the principles of the “essential facilities doctrine” were based on 
the U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis decision, the term itself was 
firstly used in the Hecht v. Pro Football Inc.136 decision. Pro Football Inc, supplier of a 
stadium and head of a Washington football team, refused access to the stadium for 
other teams. Based on the principles from the U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association 
of St. Louis decision, the “essential facilities doctrine” was firstly recognised. The 
Court ruled that it is not possible to duplicate the stadium, and the capacity is 
sufficient to allow other utilisation as well. Furthermore, the important criteria for an 
“essential facility” were determined as follows: ´…To be “essential”, a facility need not 
be indispensable; it is sufficient if the duplication of the facility would not be 
economically feasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handicap on potential 
market entrants…´.137 In other words: a potential market entrant needs coactive 
access to the facility to establish the business and a duplication of the facility is 
factually not possible.   
Important for the establishment of the “essential facilities doctrine” was the case 
Aspen Skiing Co v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.138 Object of the case was the 
following: Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, who owns one of the four major mountain 
facilities for downhill skiing at Aspen, took legal action against Aspen Skiing Co who 
owns the other three major facilities. Both operators had a long-term agreement to 
sell “multi-area” ski tickets that gave customers the flexibility to patronize any of the 
area’s ski resorts at a discounted prize. This cooperation was quit by Aspen Skiing 
Co. The US Supreme Court described these “multi-area” tickets as an “essential 
facility” to which Aspen Skiing Co denied access, with the intention to monopolise the 
business by putting Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp ski resort facilities out of business 
to get an own advantage. The court found no “normal business proposals” to 
legitimate Aspen Skiing Co actions, and therefore the Court decided that there is an 
                                            
135 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 173. 
136 Hecht v Pro Football Inc. 444 F. 2d  931 (1971)  Available at http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/887973 [Accessed 20 December  
     2008].  
137 Hecht v Pro Football Inc. 444 F. 2d  953 (1971) Available at http://www.altlaw.org/v1/cases/887973 [Accessed 20 December  
     2008].  
138 Aspen Skiing Co V Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 472 U.S. 585 (1985) Available at  http://supreme.justia.com/us/472/585/  
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obligation to work together in future.139 This decision was very controversial due to 
the fact that the Supreme Court decided, in accordance with Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, that operators with a market power have to work together to prevent an 
intention to monopolise by one of these operators.140  
Important for the development of the “essential facility doctrine” as an independent 
legal institution was the case of MCI Communication Corp. v. American Telephone & 
Telegraph Co. (AT&T).141 Almost all principles for the application of the “essential 
facilities doctrine” in the telecommunication sector were developed in this decision. 
The object of the case was the question whether MCI was allowed to expand its 
services in the long-distance area by using local network facilities from AT&T.142 
AT&T denied the access to these facilities or rather charged excessively high costs 
for the access which was in MCI´s opinion an offence against Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act. In the first instance the 7th Circuit Court followed MCI´s opinion and 
based the decision also emphatically on the “essential facilities doctrine”.143 In its 
decision the court defined, for the first time, four concrete constituent facts for the 
existence of the “essential facilities doctrine” which were based on former decisions 
like Otter Tail Power Co. v. US or Hecht v Pro Football Inc. In particular the four 
constituent facts are:  
 
• Control of the essential facilities by a monopolist; 
• A competitor’s inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential 
facility; 
• The denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and  
• The feasibility of providing the facility to competitors.144 
 
                                            
139 Aspen Skiing Co V Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. 472 U.S. 585 (1985)  Available at  http://supreme.justia.com/us/472/585/  
     [Accessed 20 December 2008].  
140 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 174,175. 
141 MCI Communication Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co  708 F.2d 1081, 1132 ((1993) Available at  
      http://supreme.justia.com/us/512/218/case.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
142 MCI Communication Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co  708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (1993) Available at  
      http://supreme.justia.com/us/512/218/case.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
143 MCI Communication Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (1993)  Available at  
      http://supreme.justia.com/us/512/218/case.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
144 Robert Pitofsky ´The essential facilities doctrine under United States antitrust law´ 6 Available at  
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Within this test the 7th Circuit Court considered that there was an “essential facilities 
claim” for MCI due to the fact that, in accordance with the court decision, AT&T holds 
a monopoly in the local network to which the access was essential for MCI and the 
provision of the facility for AT&T feasible. However, one needs to take into account 
also that the court pointed out in the decision that AT&T was not able to give proof of 
technical or economic justification for the denial of the access to the network. 
Furthermore, the court emphasised that the evidence of a limited capacity will be able 
under specific circumstances to justify the access denial. And, a local network has to 
be classified as a natural monopoly the duplication of which, for economic reasons, is 
not possible. In the succession instance the US Supreme Court made clear that the 
prevention of a transfer from a monopolistic market power to a competition market is 
to be defined as a breach of Section 2 of the Sherman Act: 
´…A monopolist’s refusal to deal under these circumstances is governed by the so-
called essential facilities doctrine. Such a refusal may be unlawful because a 
monopolistic control of an essential facility (sometimes called a “bottleneck”) can 
extend monopoly power from one stage of production to another, and from one 
market into another. Thus, the antitrust laws have imposed on firms controlling an 
essential facility the obligation to make the facility available on non-discrimination 
terms…´145 
The case of MCI Communication Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co itself 
ended up with a consent decree, but with the decision by the 7th Circuit Court and the 
statement of the U.S. Supreme Court, the establishment of competition in the 
American telecommunication market began.146  
 
                                            
145 MCI Communication Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co  708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (1993) Available at  
      http://supreme.justia.com/us/512/218/case.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
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5.3 Consequences for the development of the “essential facilities 
doctrine” 
The above mentioned precedents and other subsequent cases in connection with the 
“essential facilities doctrine” have the aim to define with contents the monopolisation 
ban as based on Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Anyway, the development of the 
“essential facilities doctrine” as an independent legal rule within the American 
antitrust law has to be critically evaluated. Similar to the decision in the MCI 
Communication Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. case, where the 
requirements of an “essential facilities claim” were developed, in some decision 
referring to this case the requirements were not fulfilled.147 In the beginning of the 
nineties of the last century, these requirements were strictly used again148 and were 
expanded to the following: To give proof of a monopolising intention it is necessary 
that the operator has the monopolising power in one market and tries to get the same 
power in another market as well. The U.S. jurisdiction does not so often refer 
emphatically to the “essential facilities doctrine” like in cases such as Hecht v Pro 
Football Inc or MCI Communication Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
However, nowadays there are new Supreme Court decisions which refer to the 
“essential facilities doctrine” as an independent legal rule like in the case of Alaska 
Airlines v. United Airlines et. al.149 from 1991, where the court pointed out: ´…Stated 
most generally, the essential facilities doctrine imposed liability when one firm, which 
controls an essential facility, denies a second firm reasonable access to a product or 
service that the second firm must obtain in order to compete with the first…´150 
To some extent, academics assume that the “essential facilities doctrine” is only a 
subset of Section 2 of the Sherman Act and not an independent legal rule. Especially 
the telecommunication cases of Southern Pacific Communication Co. v. American 
                                            
147 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 178. 
148 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 178. 
149 Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines et. al  948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) Available at  
     http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/948/948.F2d.536.90-55163.90-55162.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
150 Alaska Airlines v. United Airlines et. al  948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) Available at  
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Telephone and Telegraph151 and Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Haines & Co. Inc.152 
express this opinion. The court verified in the first case the requirements of an 
“essential facilities claim” based on the MCI Communication Corp. v. American 
Telephone & Telegraph Co. decision and came up with the result that there is no 
evidence for an anticompetitive intention of AT&T and a claim of access to the 
network has to be refused. In this connection the court pointed out that the “essential 
facilities doctrine” is a subset of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The second decision 
confirmed and concretised this opinion: There will be only a claim to get access to a 
network if the requirements of the “essential facilities doctrine” are fulfilled and, 
additionally, an anticompetitive intention can be proved. By contrast, in the Alaska 
Airlines v. United Airlines et. al. decision it was pointed out that the proof of a specific 
intention is not necessary if an operator is able, by its control of an essential facility, 
to exclude competition in this sector.153 A further concretisation of the “essential 
facilities doctrine” requirements is the later conclusion that the criterion of the ability 
to duplicate a facility will be crucial for the qualification as “essential”.154  
A few of U.S. Supreme Court decisions came up with the result that there will be a 
claim to get access to a facility, but these decisions were based on a pure breach of 
the prohibition of monopolising in accordance with Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Hence, the assumption of the establishment from the “essential facilities doctrine” as 
an independent legal rule has to observe that there is a huge insecurity in the 
application of it.155  
By contrast, the existence of the “essential facilities doctrine” has been criticised by a 
few academics. In their opinion it is sufficient to resolve cases through an efficient 
examination only with the prohibition of monopolisation based on Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act as a common antitrust rule. The court decisions only amend the content 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act with the element of the abuse control.  
A prominent critic of the “essential facilities doctrine” is Phillip Areeda. In this 
connection he wrote, the “essential facilities doctrine” is  
                                            
151  Southern Pacific Communication Co. v. American Telephone and Telegraph  740 F.2d 980 (D.C. 1984) Available at  
     http://cases.justia.com/us-court-of-appeals/F2/740/980/233981/  [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
152 Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Haines & Co. Inc  932 F.2d 610 (7th Cir.1990) Available at  
     http://bulk.resource.org/courts.gov/c/F2/932/932.F2d.610.89-2207.html [Accessed 20 December 2008]. 
153 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 179. 
154 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 179. 
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´…”so-called” because most Supreme Court cases invoked on support do not speak 
of it and can be explained without references to it. Indeed the cases support the 
doctrine only by implication and in highly qualified ways. You will not find any case 
that provides a consistent rationale for the doctrine or that explore the social costs 
and benefits or administrative cost of requiring the creator of an asset to share it with 
a rival…´156 
Areeda does not take into account that a right to get access to a facility has the aim 
to open up the market structurally and is in so far to be differentiated from the 
intention of monopolising a market. However, the criticism on the “essential facilities 
doctrine” has to be accepted in so far as its application is connected to tight 
requirements, otherwise there will be a danger for the market based on too wide 
circumferences and too fast assumption of a breach, especially in areas of sector 
specific regulation.157 
In conclusion, the declaration of the particular requirements of the “essential facilities 
doctrine”, in practice, is difficult, and the Supreme Court tried to base its decisions on 
the prohibition of monopolisation in accordance with Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
Despite this, this doctrine, in the U.S. American antitrust law to date, is an 
established legal rule to get access to such a facility.158 
5.4 Application of the “essential facilities doctrine” in the European 
antitrust and competition law 
The question is, whether the fundamentals mentioned above are able to be adopted 
in the European antitrust and competition law and which consequences it will have 
for the telecommunication sector. In this connection it needs to be clarified under 
which circumstances Art. 82 Treaty on European Union will give the right to get 
access to a network or for interconnection of networks alternatively if Art 82 Treaty on 
European Union implements an obligation in this matter. The European jurisdiction 
developed common fundamentals for the so called “third party access” which where 
later adopted in the telecommunication sector.  
                                            
156 Philipp Areeda ´Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limited Principles´ (1990) 58 Antitrust Law Journal  841 at 841. 
157 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 180. 
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5.4.1 Development of the European jurisdiction 
A number of decisions, in which a refusal for new business due to the  
termination of existing or the absence of the taking-up of future supply  
relationships of certain goods or services had to be clarified, may be  
considered as a starting point of a development in the common  
competition law, in which the refusal of access to “essential  
facilities” or products had to be adjudged as constituting abuse of a  
market dominant position in the sense of Art 82 of the Treaty on  
European Union. The following will give an overview of the most important decisions 
in this matter. 
5.4.1.1 Commercial Solvents159 
Commercial Solvents is a case based on Art 82 Treaty on European Union160 in the 
chemical industry, in which Commercial Solvents as a manufacturer of a raw product 
was found to have abused a dominant position by refusing to continue the supply to a 
downstream competitor. Due to the fact that there was no reason which justified the 
actions of Commercial Solvents, the Court of Justice of the European Communities 
(thereafter referred to as ECJ) decided that these actions constitute an abuse in 
accordance with Art 82 Treaty on European Union. Furthermore, it makes no 
difference for the application of Art 82 Treaty on European Union whether the 
manufacturer supplies other operators with his products.  
                                            
159 Court of Justice of the European Communities Cases 6/73 and 7/73, ICI and Commercial Solvents v Commission  
      [1974] ECR 223, [1974] 1 CMLR 309 Judgement of 6 March 1974 Available at  
      http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61973J0006:EN:HTML [Accessed 29 December 2008]. 
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5.4.1.2 United Brands161 
This case related to the abuse of a dominant position by United Brands, a company 
which imports the Chiquita brand of Latin American bananas. United Brands supplied 
these bananas unripe in bulk to wholesalers in various European countries, which 
used their own facilities to distribute them to retailers across their national markets. 
United Brands refused to deliver the bananas to a specific wholesaler due to the fact 
that this wholesaler was part of an advertising campaign for a competitor. The ECJ 
decided that this refusal is not justified and disproportional in comparison with the 
harassment of the wholesaler’s business interests. Furthermore, this action 
influenced the market structure because of an attempt to bind the wholesaler to a 
specific supplier. In this connection the decision covers also, amongst other things, 
issues of market definition and the concept of a dominant position.  
5.4.1.3 Télémarketing162 
Content of this decision was the fact that the respondent controls advertising space 
on a TV channel, and have a policy of rejecting adverts that encourage viewers to 
call a number unless the numbers advertised use the respondent’s own call centre. 
Télémarketing as the defendant is seeking access to advertising time that would not 
include such restrictions. The ECJ decided that it was irrelevant for application of the 
Article 82 Treaty on European Union prohibition on abuse of a dominant position that 
the dominant position might have been the result of State action. There was no 
justification for the respondent’s action. Furthermore, it was the first European 
decision where the question where there is a right for access to an essential facility 
was answered. In conclusion with the decisions mentioned above a denial of 
business is a breach with Art 82 Treaty on European Union if there is no objective 
                                            
161 Court of Justice of the European Communities Judgment of the Court of 14 February 1978 United Brands Company and  
     United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities. - Chiquita  Bananas Case 27/76  Available at  
     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=61976J0027&lg=en  
     [Accessed 28 December 2008]. 
162 Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 3 October 1985. - Centre belge d'études de marché - Télémarketing (CBEM) v SA  
     Compagnie luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion (CLT) and Information publicité Benelux (IPB). - Reference for a preliminary  
     ruling: Tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles - Belgium. - Dominant position - Telemarketing. - Case 311/84. Available at  
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justification. An action of an operator is basically justified if it does not prevent an 
effective competition. Obligations to contract have such operators who established a 
factual or lawful monopoly and who, due to this, control the access to the market or 
downstream markets for new competitors. 
5.4.1.4 RTT/GB-Inno-BM163 
Régie des telegraphes et des téléphones (RTT) under the Belgium law hold a 
monopoly over the establishment and operation of public telegraph and telephone 
lines. Furthermore, they had the power to grant or withhold authorisation to connect 
telephonic equipment, they sold their own equipment and they also had the power to 
request proof whether third party produced equipment confirms to the specifications 
they set out. GB-Inno-BM tried to sell non-approved telephone equipment in Belgium 
and a conflict arose. This is a case which lead to the question whether RTT owns an 
essential facility and refused the access to it. In this connection, the ECJ referred to 
the Télémarketing decision and held that the fact that monopoly in the 
telecommunication market for establishment and operation of the network, without 
objective necessary, reserves for itself a separate neighbouring market for 
importation, marketing and maintenance of equipment of the same network, thereby 
eliminating all competition from other undertakings, which constitutes an abuse by a 
dominant market position in accordance with Art. 82 Treaty on European Union.164 
The ECJ confirmed in its decision that an undertaking may not use a dominant 
position to eliminate competition in a downstream market. In connection with this, this 
decision is an example for the European justice in the matter of abuse of an essential 
facility but not for an access to it. 
                                            
163  Judgment of the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 13 December 1991. - Régie des télégraphes et des téléphones v GB-Inno-BM SA.  
Reference for a preliminary ruling: Tribunal de commerce de Bruxelles - Belgium. - Free movement of goods - Competition 
Type-approval of telephone equipment. - Case C-18/88. Available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61988J0018:EN:HTML [Accessed 28 December 2008]. 
164 Jonas Day ‘Essential facilities in the European Union: Bronner and beyond’ Available at  
     http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/e2d79ea9-8440-49e6-a879-    
c834f4b0b557/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9cf89b02-295b-43cf-8a00-
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5.4.1.5 Port of Rogby165 
An adoption of the “essential facilities doctrine” or part of it through the European 
Commission may be recognized in decisions like Port of Rogby in which the question 
whether a third party has to get access to a costly infrastructure that can be 
duplicated was discussed. The Commission defined in this case an essential facility 
as ´…a facility or infrastructure without which [the owner’s] competitors are unable to 
offer their services to customers…´166 
The Danish company DSB owned and operated the port of Rogby and also served 
the only ferry between Rogby and Puttgarden. Another Danish company intended to 
serve the same sailing route but DSB refused the access to the port of Rogby on the 
grounds that doing otherwise would prevent companies already operating in the port 
from expanding their services. The Danish Government meant to have a right to 
protect DSB from competition. Furthermore, they did not allow the other company to 
build a new port. The Commission decided th t the refusal was an abuse of a 
dominant market power and obliged the Danish government to allow the access to 
the port or the building of a new one. They referred to the Télémarketing decision 
and held that ´…an undertaking that owns or manages an essential port facility from 
which it provides a maritime transport service may not, without objective justification, 
refuse to grant a ship owner wishing to operate on the same maritime route access to 
that facility without infringing article [82]…´167 Furthermore, the Commission pointed 
out that ´..even on a saturated market, an improvement in the quality of products or 
services offered or a reduction in prices as a result of competition is a definite 
advantage for consumers . . .´168 
                                            
165 94/119/EC: Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 concerning a refusal to grant access to the facilities of the port of  
    Rødby (Denmark) Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994D0119:EN:NOT  
    [Accessed 28 December 2008]. 
16694/119/EC: Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 concerning a refusal to grant access to the facilities of the port of  
    Rødby (Denmark) paragraph 12 Available at  
     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994D0119:EN:NOT  [Accessed 28 December 2008]. 
167 94/119/EC: Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 concerning a refusal to grant access to the facilities of the port of  
    Rødby (Denmark) paragraph 12 Available at  
     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31994D0119:EN:NOT  [Accessed 28 December 2008]. 
16894/119/EC: Commission Decision of 21 December 1993 concerning a refusal to grant access to the facilities of the port of  
    Rødby (Denmark) paragraph 12 Available at  
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5.4.1.6 Magill169 
One of the most important cases in the European justice development in connection 
with access to essential facilities is the Magill – decision. The ECJ had to decide in 
this connection if an access to information is equal to an access to an “essential 
facility”. The ECJ opened with this decision the door for an application of the 
“essential facilities doctrine” into the intellectual property rights and defined the notion 
of abusive conduct.  The decision is based on the following facts: Most homes in the 
Republic of Ireland and around two-fifths of the homes in Northern Ireland are able to 
receive television programmes broadcast by the Irish State Broadcaster (RTE), ITV 
and the BBC. Under the United Kingdom and Irish copyright law, the BBC, ITV 
(acting through a subsidiary, Independent Television Publications Limited ("ITP")) 
and RTE own the copyright in their lists of television programmes. These three 
broadcasters provided their programme schedules free of charge to daily and 
periodical newspapers but until 1985 there was no comprehensive weekly listing 
guide. In 1985 Mr. Magill decided to produce an own Irish television guide for all 
channels and complained to the European Commission when the three broadcasters 
refused his approach to license him to reproduce their weekly listings. His complaint 
in April 1986 sought a declaration that the three broadcasters were abusing their 
dominant market positions by refusing to grant licences for the publication of their 
weekly listings and the Commission decided that there was a breach of Art. 82 of the 
Treaty on European U ion.170 The ECJ, under reference to the Commercial Solvents 
decision, upheld both the Commission's and the Court of First Instance's view that 
the refusal by television companies to permit publication of their listings was a breach 
of Art. 82 and decided to prevent publication of comprehensive listings for which 
consumer demand existed. In conclusion, an access refusal can be a breach of Art. 
82 Treaty on European Union if there was no competition established in the 
downstream market and the establishment is protected by an exclusive right.171  
                                            
169 Judgment of the Court of 6 April 1995. - Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v  
     Commission of the European Communities. - Competition - Abuse of a dominant position - Copyright. - Joined cases C-  
      241/91 P and C-242/91 P. Available at 
      http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:61991J0241:EN:HTML [Accessed 28 December 2008]. 
170 At the time of the decision Art 86 Treaty of Rome 
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5.4.1.7 SWIFT172 
The La Post/SWIFT u. GUF - decision is a case where the access to a 
telecommunication network was litigant and the European Commission altercated 
expressly the “essential facilities doctrine”. SWIFT, an association of banks, offered 
worldwide a data communication and – processing service and, in this connection, 
holds a dominant market position in Europe. SWIFT refused the approach from other 
banks to use their network. The European Commission pointed the network out as an 
“essential facility” and the abuse of the access as a breach with Art. 82 Treaty on 
European Union.173 
5.4.1.8 European Night Services Ltd (ENS)174  
Another important case which contains the requirements of the adoption of the 
“essential facilities doctrine” in the European competition law was European Night 
Services Ltd (ENS). The decision was based on Art. 81 Treaty on European Union, 
but the ECJ resorted to the fundamental principles which were developed under Art. 
82 Treaty on European Union in connection with “essential facilities”.175 The decision 
was based on the following facts: The main railway companies in the United 
Kingdom, France, Germany and Netherlands had formed a joint venture, ENS, to 
provide and operate overnight passenger rail services between the United Kingdom 
and the European continent. After the establishment of the joint venture, their market 
share was between five and eight per cent. Hence, the European Commission held 
that the agreement violated Art 81 Treaty on European Union, but granted an 
exemption for eight years provided that the parties would make the same rail services 
                                            
172 XXVII Competition review of the European Commission (1997) 67. Available at  
     ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/broch97_de.pdf [Accessed 28 December 2008]. 
173 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 195. 
174 Judgment of the Court of First Instance of 15 September 1998 in Joined Cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-388/94:  
     European Night Services Ltd (ENS) and Others v. Commission of the European Communities  Available at  
 
     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1998:340:0015:0015:EN:PDF [Accessed 30 December 2008]. 
175 Jonas Day ‘Essential facilities in the European Union: Bronner and beyond’ Available at  
     http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/e2d79ea9-8440-49e6-a879-  
c834f4b0b557/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9cf89b02-295b-43cf-8a00-
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available for possible competitors. ENS would not accept this exemption within the 
conditions. In the decision, the ECJ referred to the Magill – decision and the 
fundamental principles to Art. 82 Treaty on European Union developed in connection 
with access to an “essential facility” and refused ENS´s point of view. Furthermore, 
the ECJ held at the first time that a facility is essential if the duplication is connected 
with high costs as an independent criterion like in the US-American jurisdiction in this 
connection.176 
5.4.1.9 Bronner177 
Despite the fact that the European jurisdiction used the “essential facilities doctrine” 
or parts thereof, the Bronner/ Mediaprint decision was the first decision with a direct 
contention of the adoption of the “essential facilities doctrine” in the European law 
because the claimant stated that this doctrine is directly applicable.178 The decision 
was based on the following facts: Mediaprint was the publisher of two newspapers in 
Austria with a market share of 46, 8 per cent. Furthermore, Mediaprint holds an own 
distribution system which was able to ensure the delivery of the newspapers to the 
subscriber in the early morning. The claimant Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co.KG 
published another newspaper with a market share of 3, 6 per cent and requested the 
access to Mediaprint´s distribution systems for an equal remuneration which was 
refused before. The first instance, an Austrian Court, appealed to the ECJ with the 
question whether it is an infringement of Art. 82 Treaty on European Union when an 
operator with a dominant market power refused the approach of a competitor to get 
access to a distribution system for an equal remuneration and for the competitor the 
establishment of an own distribution system is not appropriate because of the high 
distribution costs. The ECJ decision in this case was important for the European 
                                            
176 Jonas Day ‘Essential facilities in the European Union: Bronner and beyond’ Available at  
     http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/e2d79ea9-8440-49e6-a879-  
c834f4b0b557/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/9cf89b02-295b-43cf-8a00-
3cbea13a85bf/Article%20essential%20facilities.pdf [Accessed 30 December 2008]. 
177 Judgment of the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 26 November 1998. Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und  
     Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint  
     Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. Reference for a preliminary ruling: Oberlandesgericht Wien - Austria. Case C-7/97    
      Available at  
      http://eur-lex.europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=61997J0007&lg=en  
      [Accessed 30 December 2009]. 
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jurisdiction in connection with the “essential facilities doctrine” and its coverage in the 
European competition law. In his summing up, Attorney general Jacobs made an 
analysis about the “essential facilities doctrine”. He pointed out that there is only an 
obligation for contracting for an operator with market dominant power if there are no 
other possibilities to get market access for the competitor. He also makes clear that 
Bronner can use other possibilities like retail sale or small local distribution systems 
to expand his market share – in so far the market to which the claimant would like to 
have access can be duplicated without high costs. Due to these possibilities an 
adoption of the “essential facilities doctrine” is not possible. In their decision, the ECJ 
followed the arguments of the attorney general. For the final decision whether 
Mediaprint abused a dominant market power in accordance with Art. 82 Treaty on 
European Union, the ECJ summarized the requirements for such an abuse as 
follows:179 
 
• Control of an essential facilities through an operator, which holds a dominant 
market power 
• The refusal of the access must be appropriate to exclude any competition on 
the downstream market for the asking operator 
• The facility must be indispensable for the exertion of the planned action and 
not able to be duplicated 
• There is no objective justification for the actions of the market dominant 
operator 
 
These requirements are similar to the requirements of the US American “essential 
facilities doctrine” and they make it clear that an access obligation is the exception 
and only possible if all requirements are fulfilled.  Due to the fact that Bronner had the 
possibility to use other distribution systems there was no obligation for Mediaprint to 
allow him access to their system.  
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5.4.2 Conclusion 
The Bronner decision was a miles step in the European jurisdiction in connection with 
the “essential facilities doctrine”. In a further decision the ECJ just refers to the 
requirements developed for the adoption of the doctrine. It is undoubtedly a helpful 
instrument in opening up a market for competition, particularly when the access to a 
downstream market results from legal monopolies or a facility’s owner using its legal 
monopoly to monopolize the downstream market. Beside that, it has to be shortly 
investigated whether the “essential facilities doctrine” is implemented in Art 82 Treaty 
on European Union and therefore focused on an establishment of an internal, pristine 
and effective European market as formulated in Art 3 lit. g) Treaty on European 
Union. Such a market is the result of freedom of conduct and freedom of formation of 
competing operators in a market – an obligation to contract is generally not included. 
Due to the consequences which will arise out of an obligation to contract, this 
instrument can just be used under exactly defined requirements (set out in the 
Bronner decision) which are based on competition reasons. All cases in which an 
obligation to contract can be found are based on a common ground: A potential 
competitor needs the access to an essential facility to implement its services. This 
operator is not able to get access to this facility on its own or it is too cost-intensive to 
duplicate the facility. Owner of the essential facility is the monopolist who will 
prevents the competition on this or the downstream market  A competition is 
therefore not possible. Through the appliance of the “essential facilities doctrine” this 
abusive action can be resolved and competition can be established.  The ECJ also 
highlighted this in its decision, but under the additional requirement that the action of 
the monopolist is an infringement of Art. 82 Treaty on European Union.  
5.5 The concept of the “essential facilities doctrine” in the 
European telecommunication law 
Especially in the telecommunication or in the energy market, as former monopolized 
markets, the systematics of the access to essential facilities and therefore the 
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European Union is important. In this connection there are two major possibilities to 
influence a competition which has to be established: Firstly, the refusal to get access 
to the essential facilities can be an abuse of the dominant market power to prevent 
competition and secondly, the refusal to get access to the infrastructure of the market 
dominant operators can also prevent the development of competition or new markets.  
In the telecommunication market there are different constellations in connection with 
the “essential facilities doctrine”. E.g. every operator in the telecommunication market 
needs access to end point of the network infrastructure to offer telecommunication 
services. There are different possibilities to get this access: Firstly, owning or leasing, 
as in the so-called “local loop” area, a local infrastructure. Furthermore, the access 
can be ensured with interconnection. Beside that, an operator in the 
telecommunication sector needs sector specific information to offer services like that 
of a telephone directory or directory assistance. 
5.5.1 Access Notice of the European Commission180 
The appliance of Art. 82 Treaty on European Union in the telecommunication sector 
needs exactly defined requirements under which a telecommunication operator who 
owns an essential facility for offering telecommunication services is in breach of the 
above mentioned Article. The European Commission recognized the features in this 
former monopolized sector and adopted in the “Access-Notice” the “essential facilities 
doctrine” for this sector. In this connection there are different possibilities which 
demonstrate an unjustified refusal of an access to an essential facility. In particular 
these possibilities are: 
 
• Discrimination through refusal of the access for one operator but permission 
for another operator who also offers services in the same downstream market; 
• A complete access refusal for all operators; 
• The belated access withdrawal through deprivation of the access for an 
existing operator.181 
 
                                            
180 Above 33. 
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5.5.1.1 Discrimination 
A breach of Art. 82 Treaty on European Union will be assumed without any other 
reason in the matter of discrimination of one operator. Also, the allowance to get 
access, but with different conditions, is another possibility of discrimination in this 
connection. Within the common discrimination prohibition it can be summarized that 
every operator – including the own – must get access to the facilities to same 
conditions. Furthermore, for an access obligation it is sufficient if there is just a limited 
competition in the downstream market possible – a complete exclusion is not 
necessary. In this connection it is also not crucial if the operator will develop a new 
product in the downstream market or offer services in an existing market.182 
5.5.1.2 Access refusal 
Apart from the main situations mentioned above, the European Commission 
assumes a breach of Art. 82 Treaty on European Union if the access to an essential 
facility will be refused to an operator which plans to use the facility to offer new 
services or products. In connection with the Magill decision in such an access, refusal 
may pre-empt the development of new markets which will be a damage to 
consumers. For the assumption of this breach the following five requirements must 
be fulfilled accumulatively: 
 
Essential facilities 
The access to a facility needs to be essential for implementation of services in a 
market. Taking into account the fundamental principles of the “essential facilities 
doctrine”, the European Commission pointed out in the “Access Notice” that the 
refusal to get access to a facility is responsible for the fact that competition in the 
downstream market is not possible or ineffective.183 At the time of developing the 
“Access Notice”, the European Commission was confident that in the near future no 
alternative network will exist in Europe especially in the local loop sector. This 
approach was right until the beginning of the 20th century. There are plans that the 
                                            
182 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation  (2001) 214. 
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European Commission will revise the “Access Notice”, but it this has not happened to 
date, the rules set out are still applicable. For the application of the “essential facilities 
doctrine” it has to be evaluated whether there is a bottleneck or whether other 
possibilities are getting access to a network or alternatives due to the technological 
development process. In the mobile sector the application of the “essential facilities 




The network must have sufficient capacity to ensure the access for other 
operators.185 
 
Consequences for associated markets 
An operator, which owns the essential facility, is not able to satisfy the demand of 
products or services in the established market and anticipate the development of a 
potential new service or product or affect the competition in an established or 
potential service and product market.186 
 
Access condition 
The operator, who applied for access to an essential facility, accepts an adequate 




There is no objective justification for the refusal of the access demand. In connection 
with the “Access Notice” a possible justification might be exceeding technical 
difficulties by ensuring access or investments for the establishment of new products 
or services which take time to condense to investments.188 The European 
Commission, within the last reason for justification, clearly pointed out that new 
investments are worth protecting. Another reason for justification is the fact whether  
                                            
184 Section “access to facilities” and “essential facilities” 98/C 265/02. 
185 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 215. 
186 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 215. 
187 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 216. 
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a potential operator is not able to fulfil the technical or commercial requirements for 
the use of the essential facility.189 It is important to the European Commission within 
all justification reasons that the development of the competition and within that the 
advantages for the consumers through an access refusal are not affected.190 Due to 
this, the fact that the ex-monopolist will ensure the consumer services alone is not a 
justification reason. Another justification reason is a limited capacity.191 In this 
connection there is no obligation to create new capacity but the existent capacity 
must be used effectively. An appliance of this justification reason for interconnection 
is not possible due to the fact that there is no direct utilization of the network in this 
connection.192 Finally, a justification reason might be that the local loop access can 
be responsible to anticipate the development of new technologies due to the fact that 
there is no necessity for the development of alternative technologies in this field.193 
The European Commission did not declare anything in this connection. 
The justification reasons contained in the “Access Notice” are equal to those 
developed in connection with the US American “essential facilities doctrine”. If no 
justification reason is fulfilled, the operator, who owns the facility, has the obligation 
to contract under non-discrimination conditions.194 Goal of such an obligation is the 
establishment of an effective competition in a particular market as Art. 82 Treaty on 
European Union pointed out. Due to the technical features in the telecommunication 
sector mentioned in chapter 2195 an obligation to ensure the access to the network in 
connection with Art. 82 Treaty on European Union will be assumed for every new 
operator until the construction of a new telecommunication network is cost-
effective.196 The establishment of competition in the telecommunication market is 
only possible with such an access obligation for the former monopolist.197 Most of the 
time the access will be ensured via interface and the former monopolist has to ensure 
their adequate numbers; otherwise the access obligations are constricted which is 
also a breach of Art. 82 Treaty on European Union.198  Due to this, a network 
                                            
189 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 216. 
190 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 218. 
191 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 218. 
192 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 218. 
193 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 218. 
194 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 218. 
195 Above 2. 
196 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 219. 
197 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 219. 
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operator who is able to make available the technical preconditions can then not 
refuse the access for other operators. In connection with the European jurisdiction an 
operator is obliged to ensure the best technical standard and therefore it is possible 
to ensure the market access for new operators mostly.199 Finally, the network 
operator is obliged to inform the operator who would like to get access to the network 
about all technical and system information to ensure a successful access.200 
5.5.1.3 Belated access withdraw 
It is an infringement of Art. 82 Treaty on European Union if an operator belatedly 
withdraws an access to a network without any objective justification.201  This is 
consistent with the European jurisdiction like the Commercial Solvents decision. 
5.5.1.4 Unbundling 
The unbundling of services, service criteria and facilities is a basic requirement to 
open up the telecommunication market for competition.202 In connection with this, the 
European Commission pointed out that the unbundling access to subscriber 
terminals needs specific regulations. A new operator must be able to use the 
allocated network without further and prescribed transmission capacity or 
switchboard services.203 Questions in this matter can be resolved with the direct 
application of the abo e-mentioned discrimination fundamental principles.204 
Furthermore, the European Commission pointed out in this connection that especially 
the so called “tying”, where a dominant operator forces a competitor to demand other 
services, is without justifications a breach with Art. 82 Treaty on European Union.  
                                            
199 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 219. 
200 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 219. 
201 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 219. 
202 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 220. 
203 Michael Holzhäuser Essential Facilities in der Telekommunikation (2001) 220. 
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5.5.2 Access-Directive of the European Commission205 
Based on the “Access Notice” the European Commission developed the “Access 
Directive” in 2002. The “Access Directive” regulates the interconnection and the 
access to essential facilities between different telecommunication services providers. 
In this connection, the NRA’s are allowed to ensure the access to essential network 
facilities. Furthermore, the “Access-Directive” contains some regulation for the digital 
television service. Provider of such services can be obligated to allow access to 
different elements like electronic television program services or open interfaces.206 In 
addition, the conditional access systems must be fulfilling the requirement contained 
in the annex of the “Access Directive”.  
The “Access Directive” contains instruments for the NRA’s to establish competition in 
the telecommunication sector in accordance with the principles from the “essential 
facilities doctrine” and while taking into account the “Framework Directive”. Amongst 
other such instruments are: 
 
• Transparency, like the publication of technical specification of network 
characteristics or tariffs (Art 9 Access Directive) 
• Obligations of equal treatments (Art. 10 Access Directive)  
• Obligation of separate accounting (Art. 11 Access Directive) 
• Obligations in connection with specific network facilities like the access to 
network components, obligation for negotiation, collocation and 
interconnection; and 
• Obligations for price controlling and costs accounting 
 
Within these instruments the “Access Directive” will ensure that the NRA’s have 
different commitment possibilities to dam up the dominant market power of the former 
monopolists while taking into account the commensurability basic principles.  
                                            
205 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and  interconnection of,  
     electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) Available at  
     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0019:EN:HTML [Accessed 15 December 2008]. 
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Within the “Access Directive” the “Access Notice” is not completely separate. The 
main differences between these two legislatives is that the “Access Notice” focused 
on breaching of Art 82 Treaty on European Union and the “Access Directive” set out 
rules which are similar, but the legal consequences consist of orders to ensure 
access to the facilities or for interconnection. It seems that Art. 82 Treaty on 
European Union is not longer observed by the “Access Directive” which is not true. 
The content and the developed aims of this Article in connection with the 
telecommunication sector are implemented in the “Access Directive”. Another 
difference between these two legal instruments is that the “Access Notice” is not 
binding to the member states. The content does not have to be implemented into the 
national law. The “Access Notice” is a guideline while the “Access Directive” sets out 
binding rules which have to be adopted into the national legislation of the member 
states. 
5.5.3 Conclusion 
Within the “Access Notice” and the “Access Directive” the European legislator set out  
sector specific ex ante regulations within the principles of the “essential facilities 
doctrine” for a successful establishment of competition in the European 
telecommunication market. Based on the fact that all member states must adopt the 
“Access Directive” into their national law, the creation of an internal European market 
is ensured. Apart from the positive outcome of the “Access Directive”, there is one 
criticism: the “Access Directive” is from 2002 and does not contain provision in 
connection with the developing of the so-called “new markets”. Due to this, it is highly 
controversial whether the provisions of the “Access Directive” e.g. the transaction 
thereof into the national law will be applicable in such markets too. At present a court 
case is pending in this connection207 and the European legislator is required to set 
out new rules for the telecommunication market. 
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5.6 Implementation of the Access Directive in the German 
telecommunications law 
Germany as a member state of the European Community has the obligation to 
implement the specifications of the “Access Directive” into the German law. As 
mentioned above, the “Access Directive” is based on the “Access Notice” and in so 
far the rules are in accordance with such from the “essential facilities doctrine” to 
ensure the establishment of a competition in the European telecommunication sector. 
The Directive especially contains a regulation in connection with the access to the so-
called local loop, the physical circuit connecting the network termination point at the 
subscriber’s premises to the main distribution frame208, or the interconnection, the 
physical and logical link between communication networks209 which are most 
important for the establishment of competition. The NRA’s, which are called 
Bundesnetzagentur (thereafter referred to as BNetzA) in Germany, are obliged to 
ensure that new competitors get access to network facilities of the operators with 
dominant market power – which will be in Germany the former monopolist Deutsche 
Telekom, by using the elements from the “essential facilities doctrine”. In this 
connection the NRA’s can choose which possibility they will use to oblige an operator 
with dominant market power to ensure the access to the network facilities.  
 
5.7 Access regulation in the German Telecommunication Act (TKG) 
The TKG adopted the definition of “access” from the “Access Directive” in connection 
with which “access” means the making available of facilities and/or services to 
another provider under defined conditions for the purpose of providing electronic 
                                            
208 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and  interconnection of,  
     electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) Article 2(e) Available at  
     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0019:EN:HTML [Accessed 15 December 2008]. 
209  Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and  interconnection of,  
     electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) Article 2(b)  Available at  
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communication services.210 The different possibilities to obligate an operator with 
dominant market power to ensure access to its facilities for other provider are 
contained in § 21 TKG. In this connection the access has to be ensured to the 
network and other physical facilities as well as to the telecommunication services like 
billing, collection and resale. In accordance with the “Access Directive”, the decisions 
whether an operator with a dominant market power is obliged to ensure the access to 
its facilities to another provider are so-called “discretion decisions”, which means 
under specific circumstances the operator can be obliged by the BNetzA to 
contract.211 In particular such an obligation must be imposed by the authority if the 
development of a consumer orientated competition market is endangered or the 
development is against the consumer interest (§ 21 sub 1 TKG).  
The TKG defined the “consumer orientated competition market” in the 
telecommunication sector as a market in which competition will continue after the 
sector specific regulation will be replaced by the existing competition rules.212 In 
addition, the discretion of the BNetzA in connection with the obligation to contract for 
a market dominant operator is circumscribed by the interest of legal and planning 
security for the market operators by different leading guidelines in the legislation.213 
In this connection, the TKG distinguishes between obligations of different intensity.   
Examples for a highly intensive obligation is the choosing of the operator (§ 40 TKG) 
or the offer of dedicated lines (§ 41 TKG).  
The access obligations contained in the “Access Directive” are obligations which 
have to be fulfilled if specific circumstances are presented. In this connection the 
discretion of the authority is reduced which means that only in an atypical particular 
case the operator with a dominant market power is not obliged to ensure the access 
to its facilities.  Obligations in this connection are: 
 
                                            
210 Directive 2002/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on access to, and  interconnection of,  
     electronic communications networks and associated facilities (Access Directive) Article 2(a)  Available at  
     http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0019:EN:HTML [Accessed 15 December 2008]. 
     and § 3 Nr. 32 TKG Available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/tkg_2004/index.html [Accessed 03 January 2009]. 
211 Bernd Holznagel,  Christoph Enaux and Christian Nienhaus Telekommunikationsrecht 2ed (2006) 87. 
212 § 3 Nr. 12 TKG Available at http://bundesrecht.juris.de/tkg_2004/index.html [Accessed 03 January 2009]. 
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• Completed unbundling access to subscriber terminals and common access to 
it (§ 21 sub 3 Nr. 1 TKG); 
• Interconnection of telecommunication networks (§ 21 sub 3 Nr. 2 TKG); 
• Open access to technical interfaces, protocols or other technologies which are 
essential for the interoperability of telecommunication services (§ 21 sub 3 Nr. 
3 TKG) and 
• Collocation or other possibilities of a common utilization of facilities and 
access to these facilities (§ 21 sub 3 Nr. 4 TKG). 
 
All other access obligations which are contained in § 21 sub 2 TKG are obligations 
which may be fulfilled, and the authority has a wide discretion in this connection. One 
needs to take into account that the enumeration in § 21 sub 2 TKG is not complete 
and can be amended with related obligations. Access obligations contained in § 21 
sub 2 TKG are for example: 
 
• Access to specific network components or facilities (§ 21 sub 2 Nr. 1 TKG); 
• Prohibition of belated access withdrawal (§ 21 sub 2 Nr. 2 TKG); 
• Enabling of resale (§ 21 sub 2 Nr. 3 TKG); 
• Ensuring of interoperability including roaming (§ 21 sub 2 Nr. 4 TKG); 
• Access to necessary software programs (§ 21 sub 2 Nr. 5TKG); 
• Permitting of utilization possibilities and cooperation of different operators 
(§ 21 sub 2 Nr. 6 TKG) and 
• Billing and collection (§ 21 sub 2 Nr. 7 TKG).  
 
In these cases the BNetzA can oblige a market dominant operator to contract only if 
there is a justification to ensure the access and the act itself is proportional to the 
aims of the TKG (§ 21 sub 1 TKG). The commensurability itself is concretised by 
criterions like capacity, investment and the possibilities of using other networks. 
Furthermore, specific access obligations are, of necessity, connected to other 
obligations like pricing.214 Such obligations are called accessory obligations. For 
example, a market dominant operator, who is obliged to ensure access to its facilities 
to other providers, is also obliged to charge them an adequate fee.   
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The BNetzA can also oblige the market dominant operator to create the access 
condition objective and under observation of equal opportunities for all providers (§19 
sub 1 TKG). Within this regulation the privilege of a company associated with the 
market dominant operator will be anticipated.  
Finally, the TKG contains different regulations in connection with the request for 
transparency215, for instance: information for accounting, separation of accounting, 
technical specifications, network characteristics, terms of use or fee regulation.216  
For the appliance of the regulation, the BNetzA is obliged to implement a complete 
consideration in accordance with § 21 sub 1 TKG.  A market dominant operator can 
only refuse such request for access by BNetzA by proving that through the ensuring 
of access for new providers, the network integrity or the security of the main 
operation is endangered (§ 21 sub 4 TKG). Is a market dominant operator obliged to 
ensure the access to its facilities for other providers, the operator has directly but not 
later than within three months give up an access offer (§ 22 sub 1 TKG). Within this 
regulation the legislator pointed out the priority of individual negotiations. Due to the 
fact that the negotiation position for a new operator is mostly unfair, this basic 
principle is qualified via the possibility of the authority to command the access after 
invocation of a party within ten weeks if such negotiations are not concluded (§ 25 
sub 1 TKG). To simplify and unify of the access conditions for the different facilities, 
the BNetzA can oblige the market dominant operator to publish standard offers for 
the different accesses and to contain them in the operators general terms and 
conditions (§ 23 sub 7 TKG). By contrast to individual negotiations, such a standard 
offer is binding for the asking operator and it ensures equal market chances.  
Fees for an access obligation are subject to approval in accordance with § 30 sub 1 
TKG. In this connection the BNetzA is allowed to determine the conditions for an 
access and the access fee in one step. In case of disputes, it is possible to determine 
the conditions and fee separately and in this connection each decision is 
independently judicially revisable. If the parties do not implement the access or 
interconnection order immediately, the BNetzA is allowed to appoint a coercive 
enforcement penalty up to one million Euro (§ 25 sub 8 TKG).  
                                            
215 Above 59. 
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5.8 Conclusion 
The regulations of the “Access Directive” to ensure access to essential 
telecommunication facilities, in accordance with the European legislation, are 
completely adopted into the German law.  Within the “Access Directive” the European 
legislator ensured that in all member states legislation elements of the “essential 
facilities doctrine” are implemented. However, something specific needs to be 
mentioned. The TKG, in § 9a, makes an exclusion for sector specific regulation for 
the so called “new markets” like the VDSL network. The European Commission sees 
in this regulation an abuse against the European law and a risk for the competition in 
the telecommunication sector due to the fact that mostly the former monopolist will 
have the power to invest in new networks and due to that a new monopoly might be 
created. Both parties, the German government and the European Commission were 
unable to reach agreement about this regulation and due to this, legal proceedings 
are currently pending at the ECJ.217 The so called “new markets” are not specific 
emphasised in the “Access Directive” but the question, if the regulation are also 
applicable is still discussed. Until today, there is no decision about this question and 
so the German law, which pointed out that the access in interconnection obligations, 
are not applicable in this matter, is at the moment valid. 
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CHAPTER 6 SOUTH AFRICANS APPROACH IN 
CONNECTION WITH LIBERALISATION OF 
THE TELECOMMUNICATION SECTOR UNDER 
SPECIFIC OBSERVATION OF THE 
“ESSENTIAL FACILITIES DOCTRINE” 
Similar to Europe, the South African telecommunications sector was opened up for 
competition. In this connection there are different legislations which specifically 
regulate this field. This chapter will give a short overview about the historical 
development of the legislation in this connection and especially the regulations in the 
matter of competition and access to essential facilities.  
6.1 South African legislative development in the 
telecommunication sector – an overview 
The point of departure is in Europe and South Africa similar. The South African 
Government also understood the provision with telecommunication services as a 
public utility and to ensure the universal access to the telecommunication services 
they provide it itself within a state owned monopoly – Telkom.218 By law, Telkom 
holds the exclusive privilege of constructing, maintaining or using any 
telecommunication line (Sec 78 of the Post Office Act, Act 44 of 1958). Due to the 
former apartheid system there was no telecommunication network in whole South 
Africa. White households in South Africa holds 55 per cent of the telecommunication 
network connection although they constituted only 13 per cent of South Africans total 
population. Mostly the urban provinces of Western Cape and Gauteng with a large 
white population where connected to the telecommunication network whilst the rural 
areas not.  
                                            
218 Lisa Thornton, Yasmin Carrim, Patric Mtshaulana and Pippa Reburn Telecommunications Law in South Africa 1ed (2006)  
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Influenced by the international trend, South Africa began also in the eighties of the 20 
century slowly to liberalize their telecommunication sector.  At this time “value added 
network services” (cellular network) were permitted. The real liberalisation process of 
the telecommunication sector began in the nineties of the 20 century after the 
apartheid system was disposed.  
After the first free election in South Africa in 1994, a so called technical task team 
began to work on the “Green Paper on telecommunication policy”219 (thereafter 
referred to as “Green Paper”). The “Green Paper” based on two main issues in the 
telecommunication sector: the need for an increase in penetration rates and limits for 
cross-subsidies. Furthermore, with the “Green Paper” South Africa recognized the 
necessity to open up the telecommunication sector for competition. 
Based on the “Green Paper” a National Colloquium was created which was response 
to draft the “White Paper on telecommunication policy” (thereafter referred to as 
“White Paper”) in conjunction with the Minister. The “White Paper” was issued in 
March, 1996220 and the South African government articulated the importance of 
telecommunication for the economic development of the country.221 Seeing that the 
history has proven that the protection of government-owned monopolies is may not 
the best way to ensure an universal access to the telecommunication network, the 
“White Paper” envisaged that Telkom will continuing have the exclusivity in the public 
switched telecom network for a limited time until an independent regulatory authority, 
which have to be established, will be able to implement competition in the 
telecommunication market. In this connection the “White Paper” set out specific 
deadlines for the liberalisation process in South Africa. In accordance to the Paper, 
latest in seven years after the publication, full competition in South African 
telecommunication sector will be established.  
Based on the “White Paper” framework policy, in 1996, the Telecommunications 
Act222 came into force. The Act contains provisions for regulation of 
telecommunication services, except broadcasting, and established and independent 
                                            
219 Green Paper on electronic commerce for South Africa Available at  
     http://www.polity.org.za/govdocs/green_papers/telecoms.html [Accessed 05 January 2009]. 
220 White Paper on electronic commerce for South Africa Available at  
     http://www. polity.org.za/govdocs/white_papers/telewp.html [Accessed 05 January 2009]. 
221 Lisa Thornton, Yasmin Carrim, Patric Mtshaulana and Pippa Reburn Telecommunications Law in South Africa 1ed (2006)  
     18. Available at http://link.wits.ac.za/papers/TeleLaw-full.pdf [Accessed 04 January 2009]. 
222 Telecommunications Act, Act 103 of 1996 Available at http://www.polity.org.za/docs/legislation/1996/act96-103.html  











CHAPTER 6: South Africans approach in connection with liberalisation of the telecommunication 
sector under specific observation of the “essential facilities doctrine”
68
South African Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (SATRA) and the Universal 
Service Agency (USA). In this connection, most of telecommunication services, which 
were pointed out in the Act, are regulated through licensing. In theory, the provision 
of the Telecommunications Act seems to be able to establish competition in South 
Africans telecommunication sector. In reality, within the Telecommunications Act 
Telkom still get exclusive rights to provide telecommunication services. The Act 
declared, that Telkom have the exclusive right for licences until 07 May 2002 for the 
national long distance telecommunication service, the international 
telecommunication service, the local access telecommunication service and the 
public payphone service. Within the amendment of the Telecommunications Act223 
from 07 May 2002 until 07 May 2005 Telkom and the second national operator 
(Neotel) have to share the above mentioned licences. Also the establishment of an 
independent South African Telecommunication Regulatory Authority (SATRA) was 
not as successful as it seems to be. As an independent authority, SATRA was 
subject to policy directions of the Minister of Communications which also had the 
power to set out timetables for the liberalisation process and in connection with 
Telkom´s “exclusive privileges”, the authority was not empowered to grant licences 
but could recommend that the Minister will do so.224 In accordance to the 
Telecommunications Act the USA is response to redistribute funds from Telkom as 
well as new competitors to support provisions of telecommunication services where it 
is inadequate or non-existent. Furthermore, USA helps indigent persons to cover 
their cost for telecommunication services by way of direct subsides.225  
In 2000, the current South African Regulatory Authority for Telecommunication 
(Independent Communication Authority of South Africa – ICASA) was created out of 
the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and SATRA within the Independent 
Communication Authority of South Africa Act.226 Within the ICASA Amendment Act 
from 2006 the responsibility includes now also the postal sector.227  
                                            
223 Telecommunications Amendment Act, Act 64 of 2001 Available at www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=68166  
      [Accessed 06 January 2009]. 
224 Section 5 Telecommunications Act, Act 103 of 1996 Available at  
      http://www.polity.org.za/docs/legislation/1996/act96-103.html [Accessed 05 January 2009]. 
225 Section 58 Telecommunications Act, Act 103 of 1996 Available at  
      http://www.polity.org.za/docs/legislation/1996/act96-103.html [Accessed 05 January 2009]. 
226 ICASA Act, Act 13 of 2000 Available at http://www.internet.org.za/icasa-act.html [Accessed 06 January 2009]. 
227 ICASA Amendment Act, Act 3 of 2006 Available at  http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2006/a3-06.pdf [Accessed 06  
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In 2005, the Telecommunications Act was detached by the Electronic 
Communications Act228 which provides the legal framework for convergence in the 
broadcasting, broadcasting signal distribution and telecommunications sector. The 
Act contains especially amongst others in the telecommunication sector provisions 
for licensing229, radio frequency230, technical equipment and standards231, 
interconnection232, electronic communication facilities leasing233 and broadcasting234. 
Furthermore, the Act contains regulations in competition matters.235 
The former highly discussed question of ICASA´s independence seems to be resolve 
within the Electronic Communications Amendment Act.236 The former competence of 
the Minister of Communication to give policy direction in nearly every kind of the 
telecommunication field is in so far through the new regulation limited as a direction is 
nowadays just possible in the matter of initiate and facilitate intervention to ensure 
strategies in the ICT infrastructure investment and to provide a framework of a public 
entity by the authority after obtaining the Cabinet.237 The fact that the South African 
government, especially the Department of Communication, is involved in the 
telecommunication industry will might be have not so much influence anymore. For 
clarification: The South African government owns Sentech, which provides TV/Radio 
and ISP signals238, is one of the main shareholder of Telkom (38,9 per cent)239, due 
                                            
228 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36, 2005 Available at  http://www.icasa.org.za/tabid/168/Default.aspx [Accessed 08  
     January 2009]. 
229 Chapter 3 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36, 2005 Available at  http://www.icasa.org.za/tabid/168/Default.aspx  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
230 Chapter 5 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36, 2005 Available at  http://www.icasa.org.za/tabid/168/Default.aspx  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
231 Chapter 6 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36, 2005 Available at  http://www.icasa.org.za/tabid/168/Default.aspx  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
232 Chapter 7 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36, 2005 Available at  http://www.icasa.org.za/tabid/168/Default.aspx  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
233 Chapter 8 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36, 2005 Available at  http://www.icasa.org.za/tabid/168/Default.aspx  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
234 Chapter 9 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36, 2005 Available at  http://www.icasa.org.za/tabid/168/Default.aspx  
      [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
235 Chapter 10 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36, 2005 Available at  http://www.icasa.org.za/tabid/168/Default.aspx  
      [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
236 Electronic Communications Amendment Act, Act 37 of  2007 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
237 Section 3 (1) Electronic Communications Amendment Act, Act 37 of  2007 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
238 Sentech Act, Act 63 of 1996 Available at  http://www.internet.org.za/sentech-act.html [Accessed 09 January 2009]. 
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to Telkom´s shareholding of 50 per cent of Vodacom240 indirectly interest in that 
company and finally the South African government owns the fibre network 
INFRACO.241 
6.2 Sector specific and common competition rules for the South 
African telecommunication sector – especially in terms of 
“essential facilities” 
Chapter 10 of the Electronic Communications Act contains provisions which give 
ICASA the right to set out obligations for operators and to take steps to remedy 
conduct by licenses, which results in undue performance to or undue discrimination 
against other operators.242 ICASA can set out pro-competitive terms and 
conditions243 if they find that an operator acts anti-competitively in accordance with 
section 67 (1) Electronic Communications Act by observing the following procedure: 
According to section 67 (4) ICASA has to define different markets like local loop, call 
termination or leased lines. Thereafter, an operator acting in one of these markets, 
has to be found to be one with significant market power or to control an essential 
facility or to have a vertical relationship which is able to harm the competition in this 
                                            
240 https://secure1.telkom.co.za/ir1/about_us/operational_review/operational_review.jsp [Accessed 09 January 2009]. 
241 Infraco Act, Act 33 of 2007 Available at  http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=72463 [Accessed 09 January  
     2009]. 
242 Section 67 (1) Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
243 Section 67 (4) Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
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field.244 The definition of significant market power based on the South African 
Competition Act245 (section 7) declares that an operator is dominant in the market if 
• He controls at least 45 per cent of the market or 
• He controls at least 35 per cent of the market but less then  45 per cent unless 
he can give proof that he has not the market power or 
• He controls less then 35 per cent of the market but he has the market power. 
 
If ICASA has made a decision in this connection (i.e. they have found that a licensee 
has significant market power) they investigate the specific market again with regard 
to the existing competition. In cases where no or - in ICASA´s opinion based on its 
investigation - ineffective competition exists due to the fact that one operator has the 
dominant market power or controls an essential facility in the market, ICASA can set 
out pro-competitive terms and conditions connected to the license for this operator in 
order to remedy the market failure. Such terms and conditions will generally relate to 
obligations to allow access to an essential facility under set terms and to wholesale 
pricing. ICASA is also required to set out schedules in terms of which a periodic 
review of the market will taken.246 This method of competition regulation in the 
telecommunication sector operated by ICASA seems to be a pure ex post regulation. 
Only in cases where an anti-competitive acting is observed ICASA has the right to set 
out rules to correct this acting which is a post regulation. There are no provisions in 
section 67 of the Electronic Communications Act which allow ICASA to prevent anti-
competitive acting. The experience shows, that it may be harder to resolve 
competitive problems in a sector, which was formerly dominated through a state 
owned monopoly and the achievement of the aim to establish competition can be in 
danger. This opinion has been particularly criticised by the South African Competition 
Commission. They characterise the competition regulation based on the Electronic 
Communications Act as an ex ante regulation. Due to the previous given definition of 
ex ante and ex post regulation247, an ex ante regulation is always forward looking 
                                            
244 Section 67 (5) (a) and  (b) Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
245 Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf [Accessed 08 January  
     2009].  
246 Section 67 (7) Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
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under observation of different developments like business or products. However, the 
Electronic Communications Act allows ICASA to set out pro-competitive rules if they 
define anti-competitive acting. In so far a current situation will be regulated, which is 
an ex-post view, but within foreseen elements (ex ante). Due to that, there are good 
arguments to support both meanings. 
Beside the specific competition rules, contained in the in the Electronic 
Communication Act, the South African Competition Act248 is also applicable for which 
purpose ICASA is the appropriate authority which is allowed to receive advise from 
the South African Competition Commission as well as to provide it.249 The Electronic 
Communications Act uses the term “essential facility” but do not define it. By contrast, 
the South African Competition Act defines under section 1 (1) (vi) essential facilities 
as ´...an infrastructure or resource that cannot reasonable be duplicated, and without 
access to which competitors cannot reasonable provide go ds or services to their 
customers…´.  In accordance with the Competition Act it is an abuse of a dominant 
position if an operator with a dominant market position refuses to give a competitor 
access to an essential facility if it is economically fungible.250 If an operator abused its 
dominant market power access to an essential facility can be ordered on terms 
reasonably required.251 The procedure in connection with the Competition Act is not a 
court procedure. All legal cases in this matter will be resolved by a Competition 
Tribunal, which is appointed with one Chairman and at least three other South 
African citizens.252 The Competition Tribunal is representative for the board cross-
section of the Republic and all members must have a suitable qualification and 
experience in economics, law, commerce, industry or public affairs.253 If the 
Competition recognized an in connection with the Competition Act prohibit action by 
                                            
248 Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf [Accessed 08 January  
     2009].  
249 Section 67 (9) (10) (11) Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
250 Section 8 (b) Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf [Accessed 08  
     January 2009].  
251 Section 60 (1) (a) (vii) Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009].  
252 Section 26, 27 Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009].  
253 Section 28 Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf  
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an operator254 the Commission starts to investigate in this manner.255 After 
investigation the case will close due to the fact of insufficient proof or it will referred to 
the Tribunal to continue the procedure256 with a hearing257. After the hearing the 
Tribunal can order measures which are suitable to reconstitute a condition in 
accordance with the provisions of the Competition Act. Decisions of the Competition 
Tribunal can be appealed by the Competition Appeal Court.258 
As mentioned above, the “essential facilities doctrine”, developed within the US 
American antitrust law, is applicable in different fields – especially in fields which are 
network connected, like the telecommunication sector. In accordance with the 
definition of an “essential facility” contained in the Competition Act and the prohibition 
of access refusal, the principles of the “essential facilities doctrine” seem to be 
applicable – also for the telecommunication sector. However, the Act also clearly 
stated in this matter, that the access to an essential facility can be refuse if it not 
economically fungible. A definition, what the term “economically fungible” means 
does the Act not contain.  
In the telecommunication sector the specific regulation contained in the Electronic 
Communications Act have to be observed. Although, the Electronic Communications 
Act contained no more specific exclusive rights for Telkom like the 
Telecommunications Act did259 but it has to be observed that Telkom´s position is still 
market dominant. In this connection, justification for access refusal from Telkom’s site 
like not sufficient network capacity or incompatibility of a competitor’s technology with 
Telkom´s network seems to be acceptable for an access refusal. Furthermore, the 
argument of the duplication of the network can be acceptable. Summarized, a lot of 
arguments seem to be possible to justify an access refusal to essential facilities in the 
telecommunication sector through Telkom. Therefore, the efficient of the provision in 
the Competition Act in this connection are questionable.  
                                            
254 Section 44 Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf      [Accessed 
08 January 2009].  
255 Section 4 Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf  
     [Accessed 08 January  2009].  
256 Section 50 Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009].  
257 Section 52 Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009].  
258 Section 36, 37 Competition Act, Act  89 of 1998 Available at http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/1998/a89-98.pdf  
     [Accessed 08 January 2009].  
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6.3 Existing provisions in the Electronic Communications Act in 
connection with “essential facilities” 
The Electronic Communications Act defined the term “essential facilities” in section 1 
as ´…an electronic communication facility or combination of electronic 
communication or other facilities that is exclusively or predominantly provide by a 
single or limited number of licensees and cannot feasibly (whether economically, 
environmentally or technically) be substitute or duplicated in order to provide a 
service in terms of this Act…´. Special provisions in connection with the access to an 
essential facility does the Act not contain. However, there are provisions applying 
“interconnection”260 and “electronic facilities leasing”261 which might be contain 
elements from the “essential facilities doctrine”. “Interconnection” in accordance with 
the Electronic Communications Act means ´…physical or logical linking of two or 
more electronic communication networks, electronic communication services, 
broadcasting services, services provided pursuant to a licence exemption or any 
combination thereof…´. 262 By contrast, the provisions for “electronic facilities leasing” 
applying to all electronic facilities in the matter of leasing. This includes also services 
like numbering or information. Due to the constitution of the Electronic 
Communications Act, the provisions in connection with “interconnection” are special 
provision, which just apply in this matter whilst the provision in connection with 
“electronic facilities leasing” are common provision, which applies to all electronic 
facilities with exemption of “interconnection”. The provisions in connection with 
“interconnection” itself do not contain the term “essential facility”. However, at it is 
mentioned above, the “essential facilities doctrine” is in the telecommunication sector 
applicable in connection with “interconnection”. Due to this, it has to be investigating 
if the South African legislator also adopted the “essential facilities doctrine” are 
elements thereof in the provisions applying to “interconnection”. Section 37 (1) of the 
                                            
260 Chapter 7 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
261 Chapter 8 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
262 Section (1) Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
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Electronic Communications Act pointed out, that any request on interconnection must 
be fulfilled unless the request is unreasonable. If a dispute arising out of the 
reasonableness of the request ICASA can be notify for resolution. Therefore, the 
unreasonableness has to be prescribed in at least 14 days.263 Afterwards ICASA has 
the power to decide about the reasonableness of the request and can set out orders, 
including the interconnection regulation.264 In connection with pricing, ICASA only 
has the power to set out a framework.265 These regulations seem to be appropriate to 
open up the market for competition because a request for interconnection can only 
be refuse if the request is unreasonable. Furthermore, ICASA has the power to 
determine in this connection. However, the term “unreasonable” is not defined in the 
Electronic Communications Act. It sounds like an objective justification for refusals as 
it can be found in the European legislative – but is it like that? Clarification in this 
connection is missing and so it is might be possible under the South African law to 
refuse a request on interconnection with the argument to duplicate the network. 
Furthermore the fact that ICASA is not allow to set out pricing rules or that there is no 
provision for a timeframe of ICASA´s decision do not give arguments for the 
implementation of the “essential facilities doctrine” into the South African law in 
connection with the “interconnection” provisions. Also, it would be hard for new 
operators to get the “interconnection”, because before they can request the access 
they need a licence in this connection and the licence procedure in South Africa is 
complicated and also highly discussed. 
The general provision of Chapter 8 Electronic Communications Act is that an 
electronic communications network operator must lease on request electronic 
communication facilities to other operators unless the request is unreasonable.266 In 
this connection the provisions contains in section 43 (8) the term “essential facilities” 
where the Act declare that ICASA must prescribe a list of essential facilities required 
to be leased by an electronic communication service operator. ICASA is currently 
preparing such a list. In this connection ICASA set out in December 2007 a “Draft on 
                                            
263 Section 37 (2) Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
264 Section 37 (3), 38 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
265 Section 41 Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
     http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/acts/2007/a37-07.pdf [Accessed 08 January 2009]. 
266 Section 43 (1) Electronic Communications Act, Act 36 of  2005 Available at  
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regulation prescribing a list of essential facilities” and invited interested person to 
submit written representations in this matter until February 2008.267 ICASA`s draft 
pointed out a list of essential facilities in this connection. In accordance with ICASA´s 
opinion these facilities are: 
 
• Co-location space; 
• Land based fibre optic cables; 
• Main distribution frames and ( a not limited enumeration) 
• Backhaul circuit 
• Cable landing stations 
• Co-location space 
• International gateway 
• Land line fibre optic cables 
• Main distribution frame and 
• Undersea-based fibre optic cables.268 
 
In a next step ICASA point out the general condition for the access to these facilities. 
The operator, which control the access must provide fair and non-discriminatory 
access on a written request to all operators which are allow to supply electronic 
communication services. This operator must also ensure the access to the 
operational support systems or similar software systems. The details of the access 
contract are negotiable under good faith but they apply to any operators in similar 
circumstances.269 If an operator which controls the access to an essential facility 
received a request from another operator he must confirm the receipt in two days and 
respond within five days with the content of commencement date for the access, 
inspection of the facility and associated facilities and matters related thereto. 
Furthermore, within thirty days from the date of confirmation of the receipt the 
operator which controls the access must communicate the terms and conditions of 
the access. At the same time, the operator which requested the access must also 
send a written request to ICASA in this matter. The operator, in control of the access 
                                            
267 Notice 1800 of 2007 Available at http://www.icasa.org.za/ [Accessed 31 August 2008]. 
268 Point 3.1.Notice 1800 of 2007 Available at http://www.icasa.org.za/ [Accessed 31 August 2008]. 
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must notify ICASA of its response and terms of condition of the access within five day 
of the expiration of the thirty days answering period mentioned above.270  
The charge for the access must be based on a forward-looking long term contract 
within average incremental costs of an efficient co-operation basis. If it is necessary, 
ICASA can control these cost and determine another calculation basis. In accordance 
with the COACAM-Regulations, the operator controls the access has to inform 
ICASA about the access charges.271   
If there any disputes arising out in connection with the access request the parties 
have firstly to try to resolve this dispute within negotiations, mediation or arbitration 
before this dispute will be refer to ICASA within a written notice which will made the 
scope of dispute and the different positions clear and contains a preferred remedy.272  
ICASA will resolve the dispute within thirty days after the parties submitted all 
necessary documents which were mentioned above. This dispute resolution can 
contain obligation and regulation to ensure the access to the essential facility.273 If an 
operator acting against the provisions of this regulation or ICASA´s dispute resolution 
orders a penalty not exceeding ten per cent of the operator’s annual turnover can be 
convicted.274 
The provisions in ICASA´s draft on a regulation prescribing a list of essential facilities 
do not contain the fundamentals of the “essential facilities doctrine” directly but the 
content is accordantly. Within this regulation the access to exact defined facilities will 
be possible with fair conditions for all parties. The regulation contains the principle of 
non-discrimination and transparency and also ICASA´s possibilities of acting seem to 
be efficient to ensure the establishment of competition in South Africans 
telecommunication sector. Also, the provisions in the draft are more clearly ex-ante 
provision like the European sector specific regulation in this connection. It is welcome 
to define the “essential facilities” in this connection clearly to resolve any dispute. 
Furthermore, the draft does not contained reasons for an access refusal like the 
Electronic Communications Act do in a wide form (unreasonable request). However, 
it seems to be that within such a regulation the operator controls the access has no 
                                            
270 Point 5 Notice 1800 of 2007 Available at http://www.icasa.org.za/ [Accessed 31 August 2008]. 
271 Point 7 Notice 1800 of 2007 Available at http://www.icasa.org.za/ [Accessed 31 August 2008]. 
272 Point 8 Notice 1800 of 2007 Available at http://www.icasa.org.za/ [Accessed 31 August 2008]. 
273 Point 9 Notice 1800 of 2007 Available at http://www.icasa.org.za/ [Accessed 31 August 2008]. 
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objective possibilities to refuse access request which will be not necessarily good for 
the establishment of a fair competition in this field. 
Nineteen different operators or associations submitted their presentation based on 
ICASA´s draft for an essential facility regulation.275 All presentation criticise ICASA´s 
draft in one point: the definition of essential facilities. Whist some operators would like 
to extend the drafted list of these facilities, other find that facilities like cable landing 
station or undersea based fibre optic cable are not essential facilities in this matter- 
especially in accordance of the “essential facilities” definition set out in the Electronic 
Communications Act. Another point which is highly criticized is the fact of no 
objective justification in connection with a request refusal. These two mean point 
needs to be new defined by ICASA within their final draft. By contrast, almost all 
operators or associations which submitted a presentation in this connection 
welcomed the final adoption of the content of the “essential facilities doctrine” to 
ensure a successful establishment of a fair competition in South Africans 
telecommunication sector. Now it has to be waiting on ICASA´s final draft in this 
connection and how the new legislation will be.  
6.4 Conclusion 
In South Africans current sector specific telecommunication regulation the 
fundamentals of the essential facilities doctrine are not adopted. However, the 
Competition Act contains elements from the doctrine but the application for the 
telecommunication sector seems to be difficult due to the fact of a high range of 
possibilities in connection with the objective justification of a refusal and the absent 
clarification in this matter. Within the new regulation prescribing a list of essential 
facilities, the fundamentals of the “essential facilities doctrine” will be adopted into the 
South African legislation.  
                                            
275 at&t,Blue IQ Investment Holding, Cell C, Digital Broadcasting International, Fast Com, Gateway, Internet Solutions, The  
     Internet Service Provider Association, 2 x MTN, M Web, Neotel, South Africas Communication Forum, Sentech, Smile  
     Communication Pty, The Association for Progressive Communication, Telecom Namibia, Telkom, Transnet and Vodacom All  
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CHAPTER 7 COMPARISON OF THE EUROPEAN AND 
SOUTH AFRICAN LEGISLATIVE IN 
CONNECTION WITH THE “ESSENTIAL 
FACILITIES DOCTRINE” AND CONCLUSION 
To summarise this dissertation one can say that it shows the difficulties of opening up 
a former monopolistic sector for competition. There are different economics factors 
which have to be observed in this connection as well as the different legal 
instruments such as sector specific regulation and the existing competition law. It is a 
long process which is not yet complete due ongoing technical developments. 
The “essential facilities doctrine”, developed from the U.S. American antitrust law, is 
a useful instrument to liberalized former monopoly dominated markets like the 
telecommunication market. The fundamentals of the doctrine are able to develop an 
ex ante sector specific regulation to establish competition in such markets.  
In Europe, the fundamentals of the “essential facilities doctrine” are implemented in 
the sector-specific ex-ante regulation of the “Access Doctrine”. Due to the fact of the 
responsibilities of the member state to adopt this provision into their own legislative 
an internal European market in the telecommunication sector was created. The 
example of Germany shows that NRA’s are able to control the establishment of 
competition in former monopolized sectors within the specific regulation. Europe 
began early to liberalize their telecommunication market and has now to resole new 
responsibilities like the regulation of the so called “new telecommunication markets”. 
The telecommunication sector will grow rapidly and due to this, legislation has to be 
created in future which is predictable and able to resolve all problems which will arise 
out of new developments. 
By contrast, the liberalisation process in South African telecommunication sector 
began relatively late. Within the development of new legislation like the 
Telecommunications Act, competition in the sector was due to the fact of Telkom´s 
exclusive rights until 2005 were not really created. Also the fact that ICASA or the 
forerunner authority SATRA, until the end of 2007, were controlled by the Minister of 
Communication, did not help to establish competition successfully in the 
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contain elements of the “essential facilities doctrine” and the sector specific 
competition law regulations are ex post regulations. The example of Europe shows 
that a successful establishment of competition needs firstly ex ante sector specific 
regulations to ensure new competitors the access to the market. Although the 
existing South African competition law contains provisions of the “essential facilities 
doctrine” which can also be used in the telecommunication sector – these provisions, 
as mentioned, are too wide in connection with an objective justification referring to a 
refusal of an access request. Only within new drafts, like the draft of prescription of 
essential facilities in connection with the Electronic Communications Act, South 
Africa started to implement the fundamentals of the “essential facilities doctrine” in 
their legislation and created ex ante sector specific regulations. The final provisions 
in this connection are still outstanding, but it seems likely that South Africa finally 
learns from the experiences of other states in connection of the adoption of the 
“essential facilities doctrine” to establish successfully a fair competition in the 
telecommunication sector. 
The conclusion is that South Africa learnt from Europe – or other states – that there 
are possibilities to establish a competition in former monopolized sectors. At the end 
of the day, Europe and South Africa are currently at different points: while Europe 
established successful competition in the telecommunication sector and therefore 
had the problem of creating new legislation for new developing electronic 
communication markets, South Africa finally started with sector specific regulation to 
create (real) competition in the telecommunication sector. However, in this 
connection there is an advantage for South Africa which is able to incorporate also 
the new markets from the beginning on in their sector specific regulation. Reforms in 
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